Varieties of Capitalism 2001
DOI: 10.1093/0199247757.003.0006
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The Domestic Sources of Multilateral Preferences: Varieties of Capitalism in the European Community

Abstract: Explains how variations in the structure of a country's economic system shape their preferences over other forms of multilateral international organizations. It specifically answers why Britain and Germany advocated different regulatory structures in the European Union's monetary, social, and industrial policies in the context of negotiating the content of the Maastricht Treaty. Theoretically, the paper explores ways in which the varieties of capitalism framework can be extended to the domain of international … Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

1
40
0
5

Year Published

2005
2005
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
6
4

Relationship

0
10

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 132 publications
(46 citation statements)
references
References 287 publications
1
40
0
5
Order By: Relevance
“…In order to explain the politics of the CRD IV, that is member states and industry preferences in the negotiations on the new capital and liquidity rules, this article builds on and develops further the literature that examines the specific features of national banking systems (Allen and Gale 2000;Deeg 2010;Hardie and Howarth 2013) and links these features to member states and industry preferences concerning EU financial regulation (Busch 2004;Fioretos 2001Fioretos , 2010Macartney 2010;Zimmerman 2010; for a somewhat different version of this argument see Mü gge 2010). Adopting a comparative political economy analysis, this article sees member state and industry preferences determined by a combination of political economy factors and, notably, the institutional features of the national banking sector.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In order to explain the politics of the CRD IV, that is member states and industry preferences in the negotiations on the new capital and liquidity rules, this article builds on and develops further the literature that examines the specific features of national banking systems (Allen and Gale 2000;Deeg 2010;Hardie and Howarth 2013) and links these features to member states and industry preferences concerning EU financial regulation (Busch 2004;Fioretos 2001Fioretos , 2010Macartney 2010;Zimmerman 2010; for a somewhat different version of this argument see Mü gge 2010). Adopting a comparative political economy analysis, this article sees member state and industry preferences determined by a combination of political economy factors and, notably, the institutional features of the national banking sector.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Fioretos (2001) is a notable exception, but his pioneering effort to anchor a theory of firms' preferences over international rules in an institutionalist framework still construes actors as caring only about the direct effects of common rules on institutional investments in their own country. The present article shows that actors additionally care about the constrain-thy-neighbor effects of common rules.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such conclusions can build upon Fioretos' (2001) case study on German and British preferences on the Treaty on European Union (see chapter 1.1). His key argument is that "the shape of multilateralism that an EC member espouses depends primarily upon the potential or actual implications of the form of multilateralism on the ability of that country to sustain the comparative institutional advantages provided by its specific variety of capitalism (ibid, 215)."…”
Section: Explaining European Integration In the Light Of Vocmentioning
confidence: 94%