The Diverse Effects of Government Propaganda in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Turkey

Abstract

Autocrats employ overt propaganda to signal strength and suppress opposition. Previous research conducted in closed autocracies indicates that such "hard propaganda" effectively helps them achieve these objectives. Yet the specific mechanisms and contextual factors influencing how and when it works remain unclear. We theorize how hard propaganda works differently for government supporters and opponents in competitive authoritarian regimes, focusing on emotional reactions and downstream effects on political action. Through two pre-registered surveys in competitive authoritarian Turkey (N=6,286), we find that supporters exposed to propaganda feel increased group belonging and are more susceptible to engage in pro-government activities. Opponents report heightened anger and anxiety and seem deterred from protesting. However, this deterrence effect weakened during the highly contested 2023 electoral campaign. These results indicate that hard propaganda can help competitive autocrats deter anti-government action and encourage pro-government action, but that its deterrent effects may weaken during periods of high mobilization.