The distributional outcomes of rights-based management in fisheries

Abstract

Fisheries managers have increasingly adopted rights-based management (i.e., “catch shares” or “individual transferable quotas” [ITQs]) to address economic and biological management challenges under prior governance regimes. Despite their ability to resolve some of the symptoms of the tragedy of the commons and improve economic efficiency, catch shares remain controversial for their potentially disruptive social effects. One criticism is that the benefits of rights-based reforms are unequally distributed across vessels and between fishery participants (e.g., crew and hired captains) and that stakeholders that do not receive an allocation of harvest rights may see their remuneration decrease. Yet, empirically assessing these claims is difficult in almost all ITQs due to poor availability of longitudinal cost, earnings, and employment data. This paper evaluates these claims using vessel-level data to characterize impacts of a long-established ITQ program for Alaskan crab fisheries on the level and distribution of payments to claimant groups. We find that the share of vessel proceeds accruing to captains, crew, and vessel owners declined under the catch-share regime to make room for new payments to quota owners. Average daily payments to captains, crew, and vessel owners declined, albeit slightly, yet retained their pre-ITQ premia relative to compensation in other sectors. However, inequality in payments to workers and vessel owners declined after ITQs, as did the interseasonal volatility in compensation to workers, a measure of financial risk. Finally, we find that consolidation-induced increases in leasing costs have had little effect on workers’ remuneration, but have reduced returns to vessel ownership.

The social and economic dimensions of one of the world’s longest-operating shark fisheries

“…This, combined with the increasing global demand for fish (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2020) and the use of rights-based management to improve bioeconomic outcomes can result in the consolidation of fishing rights in fewer operators and negative social and economic effects on coastal communities excluded from the distribution of fishing rights (e.g. Abbott et al 2022).…”

True insights or ticking boxes? Rapid assessment of rights‐based management in artisanal fisheries

“…Therefore, RBFM for (Cardenas, 2000). This can contribute to broader social problems related to inequitable distribution of income and resource access observed in management systems throughout the world (e.g., Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, USA; Abbott et al, 2022;Bodwitch et al, 2022;Hoefnagel & de Vos, 2017;Pinkerton, 2019).…”

“…Indeed, traditional (often informal) fisheries access mechanisms can be actively undermined through implementation of RBFM, where new institutional systems crowd out or de‐incentivize people from following existing norms around resource use (Cardenas, 2000). This can contribute to broader social problems related to inequitable distribution of income and resource access observed in management systems throughout the world (e.g., Canada, New Zealand, the Netherlands, USA; Abbott et al, 2022; Bodwitch et al, 2022; Hoefnagel & de Vos, 2017; Pinkerton, 2019). Sometimes catch shares are collectively granted (e.g., community quotas), but can still generate unintended social contradictions and tensions that emerge because of a shift toward fisheries as a form of enclosure or commoditization, rather than spaces for complex and dynamic social–ecological relationships (Mansfield, 2004).…”

Global insights on managing fishery systems for the three pillars of sustainability

“…Fishers can also be excluded from participating because of the high value of fishing quotas, and the rural–urban shift of quota and increasing concentration of quota among non‐locals drives concerns about equity and emigration from rural, coastal communities (Carothers & Chambers, 2012; Soliman, 2014), notwithstanding concerns over fisher well‐being and job satisfaction (Pollnac & Poggie, 2008). Abbott et al (2022) show that the share of vessel earnings accruing to captains, crew and vessel owners declines following catch share implementation in the Bering Sea crab fisheries as the share held by quota owners increases. However, the volatility in compensation, and thus financial risk, to workers declined following catch share implementation.…”