1992
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1992.tb00678.x
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The Disjunction Effect in Choice under Uncertainty

Abstract: One of the basic axioms of the rational theory of decision under uncertainty is Savage's (1954) sure-thing principle (STP) It states that if prospect x is preferred to y knowing that Event A occurred, and if x is preferred to y knowing that A did not occur, then x should be preferred to y even when it is not known whether A occurred We present examples in which the decision maker has good reasons for accepting x if A occurs, and different reasons for accepting x if A does not occur Not knowing whether or not A… Show more

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Cited by 504 publications
(542 citation statements)
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“…Third, competitive comparisons offer compelling reference points that may deviate significantly from the reference points people originally used in their initial evaluations. The change of reference points can be a potent trigger of judgment revisions (Hsee & Leclerc, 1998;Tversky & Shaffir, 1992). Finally, recent research suggests that in judgment and choice, people have a natural tendency to assess the mapping of features across alternatives.…”
Section: The Comparison-revision Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Third, competitive comparisons offer compelling reference points that may deviate significantly from the reference points people originally used in their initial evaluations. The change of reference points can be a potent trigger of judgment revisions (Hsee & Leclerc, 1998;Tversky & Shaffir, 1992). Finally, recent research suggests that in judgment and choice, people have a natural tendency to assess the mapping of features across alternatives.…”
Section: The Comparison-revision Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In fact, empirical estimates find that losses are weighted about twice as strongly as gains [20,39]. Many people, for example, reject a 50-50 chance to win $200 or lose $100, even though the gain is twice as large as the loss [40]. Preferences that weigh losses more heavily than gains are said to exhibit "loss aversion.…”
Section: The Behavioral Approachmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Conflict Among Alternatives and the Search for Dominance Tversky and Shafir [1992] found these results in the presence of conflicting choices: "You can either select one of these gambles or you can pay $1 to add one more gamble to the choice set. The added gamble will be selected at random from the list you reviewed.…”
Section: Satisficingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In an experiment by Tversky and Shafir [1992], students were asked to fill out a questionnaire for $1.50. They were then offered either a metal zebra pen for the $1.50, or they were offered a choice of a metal zebra pen or two plastic pilot pens for the $1.50.…”
Section: Additional Alternatives Maintain the Status Quomentioning
confidence: 99%