2019
DOI: 10.1177/0047117819856397
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

The diplomacy of post-Soviet de facto states: ontological security under stigma

Abstract: Why do post-Soviet de facto states (such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia) regularly interact with remote Pacific islands or Latin American countries, even though they are not bound by any meaningful political, economic or military ties? This article argues that the diplomatic relationship management amounts to a strategy of external legitimacy-building through stigma rejection and ontological security-attainment. This diplomatic practice creates positively tinged social affiliations, whereby the unrecognized ent… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
8
0

Year Published

2020
2020
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
9

Relationship

1
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 18 publications
(8 citation statements)
references
References 49 publications
0
8
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Irrespective of the precise denomination, however, ontological security has proved fruitful for addressing a wide variety of theoretical and empirical concerns. It has allowed scholars interested in status (Pacher, 2019; Zarakol, 2010, 2011), revisionism (Behravesh, 2018), ideology (Marlow, 2002), and nationalism (Kinnvall, 2004; Skey, 2010) to enter into a conversation with scholars working on identity practices (DeRaismes Combes, 2017), material environments (Ejdus, 2017, 2020), collective memory (Gustafsson, 2014; Mälksoo, 2015; Subotić, 2019), transitional justice and reconciliation (Gustafsson, 2020; Mälksoo, 2019; Rumelili, 2018), diasporas (Abramson, 2019; Kinnvall and Nesbit-Larkin, 2009), regionalism (Russo and Stoddard, 2018), foreign policy (Darwich, 2016; Lupovici, 2012; Mitzen and Larson, 2017; Oppermann and Hansel, 2019), power transitions (Chacko, 2014; Young, 2017), popular protests (Solomon, 2018), populism (Browning, 2019; Kinnvall, 2018; Steele and Homolar, 2019), or security communities (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010; Greve, 2018). Thus, ontological security scholarship has certainly succeeded in inaugurating a new research agenda and in generating new interpretations of a great variety of issues in international politics.…”
Section: Ontological Security In International Relationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Irrespective of the precise denomination, however, ontological security has proved fruitful for addressing a wide variety of theoretical and empirical concerns. It has allowed scholars interested in status (Pacher, 2019; Zarakol, 2010, 2011), revisionism (Behravesh, 2018), ideology (Marlow, 2002), and nationalism (Kinnvall, 2004; Skey, 2010) to enter into a conversation with scholars working on identity practices (DeRaismes Combes, 2017), material environments (Ejdus, 2017, 2020), collective memory (Gustafsson, 2014; Mälksoo, 2015; Subotić, 2019), transitional justice and reconciliation (Gustafsson, 2020; Mälksoo, 2019; Rumelili, 2018), diasporas (Abramson, 2019; Kinnvall and Nesbit-Larkin, 2009), regionalism (Russo and Stoddard, 2018), foreign policy (Darwich, 2016; Lupovici, 2012; Mitzen and Larson, 2017; Oppermann and Hansel, 2019), power transitions (Chacko, 2014; Young, 2017), popular protests (Solomon, 2018), populism (Browning, 2019; Kinnvall, 2018; Steele and Homolar, 2019), or security communities (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010; Greve, 2018). Thus, ontological security scholarship has certainly succeeded in inaugurating a new research agenda and in generating new interpretations of a great variety of issues in international politics.…”
Section: Ontological Security In International Relationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the state award's overwhelming focus on Russia and the absence of Ukrainian recipients can be explained by existing frameworks, this article's analysis also points towards an understudied issue, namely, the hitherto unexplained ties that bind the Transnistrian de facto state with, on the one hand, the elites from other post-Soviet de facto states, most notably Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, on the other, politically relevant entities beyond that, such as the Catholic Church and transnational actors (Pacher 2019). When analysing de facto states, most researchers have focused on either the ties that bind them to their patrons or adversaries, or on systemic forces embodied by the United States, and have seldom gone further.…”
mentioning
confidence: 88%
“…So far, most research has focused on de facto states' ties to their patrons and 'parent states', that is, the de jure states from which they have broken away (Deudney & Ikenberry 2009;Souleimanov et al 2018), or on structurally determined interactions with great powers such as the United States (Coggins 2011;Pegg & Berg 2016). While the list of recipients of the Order of Friendship confirms that Transnistria's main external reference point is Russia (Gnedina 2015;Nitoiu 2018), it also indicates that de facto states regularly foster ties with each other (Isachenko 2012;Kosienkowski 2012;Toomla 2016) and with other international actors, including the Catholic Church (Comai 2017;Pacher 2019). Secondly, state awards, despite their pedigree and ubiquity, have never received focused attention in International Relations scholarship.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The global arena is an open space where multiple actors, agencies, events, norms, entanglements and estrangements take place. In such an environment, prospects for diplomatic recognition and admission into international society are not entirely determined by discursive and performative efforts, but also by situational entanglements and the suitability of assemblages of transnational relations (see Fernández-Molina, 2019; Pacher, 2019). A number of aspirant states, mostly concentrated in the former Soviet space, that are solely dependent on Russia as a ‘patron state’ are not entirely committed to full and recognizable statehood as their purpose of existence is between reunification with another external state and retaining liminal status for geopolitical reasons (see Ó Beacháin, 2020).…”
Section: Towards a Critical Research Agenda On State Recognitionmentioning
confidence: 99%