The Dilemma of Case Studies Resolved: The Virtues of Using Case Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science

Burian, Richard M.

doi:10.1162/106361401760375794

Cited by 63 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…Several responses to the methodological challenges discussed above have been suggested, including treating case studies as a means for suggesting new philosophical perspectives (Burian, 2001;Chang, 2012), adopting a hermeneutical approach (Schickore, 2011), and being more cautious about what sorts of philosophical claims can be inferred from cases (Kinzel, 2015). We agree that greater caution about the philosophical consequences of case studies is sometimes warranted.…”

Section: The Methodology Of Case Studies In Philosophy Of Sciencementioning

confidence: 98%

Scientists’ attitudes on science and values: Case studies and survey methods in philosophy of science

Steel

Gonnerman

O’Rourke

2017

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

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Section: The Methodology Of Case Studies In Philosophy Of Sciencementioning

confidence: 98%

Scientists’ attitudes on science and values: Case studies and survey methods in philosophy of science

Steel

Gonnerman

O’Rourke

2017

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

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“…A number of practitioners of integrated history and philosophy of science have responded to Pitt's challenge (Burian, 2001(Burian, , 2002Schickore, 2011;Chang, 2011). Chang in particular has articulated conceptual moves that may allow us to break free from the dilemma of case studies.…”

Section: Naturalism For Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a Methodology for Integrated History and Philosophy of Science

Scholl

Räz

2016

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science

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A glaring asymmetry, obvious at this meeting, is that historians dress better than philosophershistorians always being interested in the details, sartorial and otherwise, while philosophers seem concerned only with dressing in general.-Richards (1992)Abstract We respond to two kinds of skepticism about integrated history and philosophy of science: foundational and methodological. Foundational skeptics doubt that the history and the philosophy of science have much to gain from each other in principle. We therefore discuss some of the unique rewards of work at the intersection of the two disciplines. By contrast, methodological skeptics already believe that the two disciplines should be related to each other, but they doubt that this can be done successfully. Their worries are captured by the so-called dilemma of case studies: On one horn of the dilemma, we begin our integrative enterprise with philosophy and proceed from there to history, in which case we may well be selecting our historical cases so as to fit our preconceived philosophical theses. On the other horn, we begin with history and proceed to philosophical reflection, in which case we are prone to unwarranted generalization from particulars. Against worries about selection bias, we argue that we routinely need to make explicit the criteria for choosing particular historical cases to investigate particular philosophical theses. It then becomes possible to ask whether or not the selection criteria were biased. Against worries about unwarranted generalization, we stress the iterative nature of the process by which historical data and philosophical concepts are brought into alignment. The skeptics' doubts are fueled by an outdated model of outright confirmation vs. outright falsification of philosophical concepts. A more appropriate model is one of stepwise and piecemeal improvement.

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“…However, I make use of my empirical insights to formulate a distinction of two congurations of epistemic dependence which I hope will prove fruitful in reections which go beyond the case I have studied (cf. Burian 2001;Chang 2011;Schickore 2011). 7 I call the two academic research groups that I have each studied over the course of more than a year the 'planetary science group' (group 1) and 'the molecular biology laboratory' (group 2), respectively.…”

Section: Case Study: Research Group Collaborationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opaque and Translucent Epistemic Dependence in Collaborative Scientific Practice

Wagenknecht¹

2014

Episteme

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This paper offers an analytic perspective on epistemic dependence that is grounded in theoretical discussion and field observation at the same time. When in the course of knowledge creation epistemic labor is divided, collaborating scientists come to depend upon one another epistemically. Since instances of epistemic dependence are multifarious in scientific practice, I propose to distinguish between two different forms of epistemic dependence, opaque and translucent epistemic dependence. A scientist is opaquely dependent upon a colleague if she does not possess the expertise necessary to independently carry out, and to profoundly assess, the piece of scientific labor which her colleague is contributing. If the scientist does possess the necessary expertise, I argue, her dependence is translucent. However, the distinction between opaque and translucent epistemic dependence does not exhaust dependence relations in scientific practice, because many dependence relations are neither entirely opaque nor translucent. I will discuss why this is the case, and show how we can make sense of the gray zone between opaque and translucent epistemic dependence.

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The Dilemma of Case Studies Resolved: The Virtues of Using Case Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science

Abstract: Philosophers of science turned to historical case studies in part in response to

Cited by 63 publications

References 19 publications

Scientists’ attitudes on science and values: Case studies and survey methods in philosophy of science

Scientists’ attitudes on science and values: Case studies and survey methods in philosophy of science

Towards a Methodology for Integrated History and Philosophy of Science

Opaque and Translucent Epistemic Dependence in Collaborative Scientific Practice

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