The diffusion of financial supervisory governance ideas

Gandrud, Christopher

doi:10.1080/09692290.2012.727362

Cited by 41 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…The effect of CBI on deregulation is more likely to materialize when the government is also the main banking regulator. Banking regulation is often under the control of the central bank, the government, and sometimes some other independent authority (Gandrud 2013). If financial deregulation is indeed a political tool (as we claim), then it should only be implemented if the regulatory power is in the hands of the government and not when it is controlled by the central bank (as is often the case).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 97%

The Side Effects of Central Bank Independence

Aklin

Kern

2020

American J Political Sci

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Central bank independence (CBI) solves the time inconsistency problem faced by policymakers with respect to monetary policy. However, it does not solve their underlying incentives to manipulate the economy for political gains. Unable to use monetary policy, and often limited in their ability to use fiscal spending, governments can resort to financial deregulation to generate short-term political benefits. We show qualitatively and quantitatively that governments systematically weaken financial regulations in the aftermath of CBI, and that the effect of CBI is separate from an ideological shift toward liberalization. Our findings suggest that the growing financialization of the economy experienced by many countries over the last few decades is partly a by-product of central bank independence.

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Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 97%

The Side Effects of Central Bank Independence

Aklin

Kern

2020

American J Political Sci

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“… 1. The diffusion literature, which explores how ideas and policy regimes that originate in one national political economy spread to other locations within the system, constitutes an important exception (see, e.g., Barthel and Neumayer, 2012; Braun and Gilardi, 2006; Cao, 2010; Elkins et al, 2006; Gandrud, 2013; Gilardi, 2012; Greenhill et al, 2009; Meissner, 2005; Prakash and Potoski, 2007; Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Simmons et al, 2006; Solingen, 2012; Strange, 1996). …”

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confidence: 99%

Toward a political economy of complex interdependence

Oatley

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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How should we theorize about international political economy in an era of complex interdependence? The global economy is much more interdependent today than it was 40 years ago. As a result, there is a widening appreciation that we need new theoretical tools to understand how complex interdependence arose, how it operates, and where it might be headed. I argue that to develop such tools, we must embrace new theoretical logics that more readily accommodate and explain change. I develop this point by drawing on complexity theories, ecology, and information theory. I first develop the core elements of a complexity-based approach and contrast it to the central assumptions of the Open Economy Politics approach. I then illustrate this complexity-oriented approach by using the logic of coevolution and the information–entropy cycle to explain key elements in the development of the 2008 global financial crisis.

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“…The delegation of specialised powers to independent regulatory agencies is not a new phenomenon in economic and financial governance. Notable examples include the diffusion of delegating monetary authority to independent central banks (Maxfield 1997, McNamara 2002, Grabel 2003 and delegating supervisory powers to unified financial authorities (Masciandaro 2007, Gandrud 2012. However, the question of why policy-makers distribute some of their powers to independent technocrats is always interesting; it may even be confounding in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The symbolic politics of delegation: macroprudential policy and independent regulatory authorities

Lombardi

Moschella

2016

New Political Economy

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This paper investigates the motivations that led policy-makers to delegate macroprudential authorities to newly created independent systemic regulatory authorities (SRAs). Three case studies are examined: the US Financial Stability Oversight Council, the European Systemic Risk Board and the UK's Financial Policy Committee. Policy-makers' motivations are captured by examining the specific institutional features of the newly created SRAs and by tracing the legislative debates that surrounded their creation. The findings of this empirical analysis call into question several of the conventional claims that are used to justify delegation to technocratic agencies from the functionalist and ideational scholarship. Given the limitations of the explanations based on efficiency considerations and socialisation of welfare losses, this paper suggests that the delegation of powers to SRAs was ultimately motivated by what is referred to as the 'logic of symbolic politics.' It is argued that the main motivation that emerges from the legislative debates for delegating this important task is that the SRAs provided a quick institutional 'fix' to signal to the public that in the wake of the international crisis of 2007-2009, policy-makers were redressing regulatory mistakes made prior to and during the crisis that had caused a severe deterioration of public's wealth.

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The diffusion of financial supervisory governance ideas

Cited by 41 publications

References 59 publications

The Side Effects of Central Bank Independence

The Side Effects of Central Bank Independence

Toward a political economy of complex interdependence

The symbolic politics of delegation: macroprudential policy and independent regulatory authorities

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