The “dictator’s endgame”: Explaining military behavior in nonviolent anti-incumbent mass protests

Croissant, Aurel; Kuehn, David; Eschenauer, Tanja

doi:10.1080/17419166.2017.1423471

Cited by 46 publications

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“…How does a dictator respond to a large‐scale uprising that demands a change in the regime or their resignation? This article addresses this issue to examine the actions of dictators in such a situation that is termed as “the dictator's endgame” (Croissant et al, 2018; Pion‐Berlin & Trinkunas, 2011, p. 398). This article specifically deals with dictators' responses to protests; that is, whether or not they order the repression of protests.…”

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“…The dictator's endgame is defined as “a situation where political incumbents are challenged by mass protest and the military turns into the ultimate guardian of the survival of a political leader” (Croissant et al, 2018, p. 194). In the endgame, popular mass uprisings create insecurity and shorten horizons in the decision‐making process of any agent in the state apparatus, greatly differing from any usual situation (Koehler & Albrecht, 2021, p. 151).…”

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Losing power safely: Explaining the variation in dictators' responses to anti‐regime protests

et al. 2022

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This study aims to understand a dictator's response to large‐scale anti‐regime protests regarding their safety. While dictators tend to order the repression of such protests, in some cases, they voluntarily cede power without such repression. Earlier studies based on the assumption that leaders always act to maintain power cannot explain this variation. This article presents a novel claim that dictators choose the way in which they lose power. It argues that since dictators who lose power by coups suffer a worse fate than those who lose power following protests, they prefer to relinquish power by the latter if they anticipate that repressing dissent will result in a coup. Thus, dictators prefer a safer way of losing power over maintaining their office at all costs. Data on the post‐tenure fate of dictators from 1946 to 2010 and the case of South Korean anti‐regime protests in 1987 support this theory. Related Articles Hellmeier, Sebastian. 2016. “The Dictator's Digital Toolkit: Explaining Variation in Internet Filtering in Authoritarian Regimes.” Politics & Policy 44(6): 1158–91. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12189 Hiroi, Taeko, and Sawa Omori. 2013. “Causes and Triggers of Coups d'état: An Event History Analysis.” Politics & Policy 41(1): 39–64. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12001 Hunter, Lance Y., Josh Rutland, and Zachary King. 2020. “Leaving the Barracks: Military Coups in Developing Democracies.” Politics & Policy 48(6): 1062–103. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12383

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Losing power safely: Explaining the variation in dictators' responses to anti‐regime protests

et al. 2022

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“…Militaries with a history of being in power are determined to maintain their prerogatives at the end of the transition (Brownlee et al, 2015), and they are likely to intervene in short democratic experiments (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). More generally, a loyal military is crucial to keep dictators in power during "endgame scenarios" (Croissant et al, 2018). Therefore, we include recently developed measures of the executive's power base.…”

Section: Identifying and Quantifying Structural Conditionsmentioning

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How to Build Democracy after Authoritarian Breakdown: Insights from a Mixed Methods Approach

2021

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Mass movements that are able to overthrow a dictator do not always lead to democracy. Transition periods present narrow windows of opportunity in which activists face difficult decisions to build democracy and prevent authoritarian relapse. Existing scholarship offers limited guidance for prodemocracy forces because it focuses on unchangeable structural factors and cases with a known outcome. We propose an innovative approach for finding informative comparisons for ongoing transitions after authoritarian breakdowns. We quantify the similarity between all breakdowns caused by mass uprisings since 1945 based on their structural preconditions. We then apply our approach to Sudan's ongoing transition and draw lessons from three similar cases: Benin in 1990, the Philippines in 1986 (successful democratization) and Burma in 1988 (failed democratization).Our case studies suggest that democratic transition is possible in Sudan if pro-democracy forces maintain unity, build inclusive political agendas and keep the military committed to the democratic process.

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“…How convergent or divergent are military-society relations can have serious repercussions for regime survival. Civil-military scholarship on the Arab Spring and its aftermath has brought into sharp relief just how critical the military is to the fate of popular uprisings against autocratic regimes, and to the fate of the besieged autocrats themselves (Albrecht et al 2016;Barany 2016;Bellin 2012;Croissant et al 2018;Lutterbeck 2013;Pion-Berlin 2016b;Pion-Berlin et al 2014). A military has choices: it can remain loyal to the authorities by repressing the opposition; it can stay quartered and remove itself from the political maelstrom; or it can defect by either joining the protests or overthrowing the regime.…”

Section: Military-society Relationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Civil-Military Relations: What Is the State of the Field

Pion-Berlin

Dudley

2020

Handbook of Military Sciences

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In the study of states and societies, civil-military relations ought to occupy a central position. It is only the armed forces that can provide for a nation's defense and at the same time are capable of overturning that nation's government. These dual powers are extraordinary and can constitute both an essential coercive asset and a potential threat to governments and citizens that must be neutralized. The goal of any state is to harness military professional power to serve vital national security interests, while guarding against the misuse of power that can threaten the well-being of its people. To face this challenge, governments must be properly equipped and motivated to lead, militaries must be sufficiently subordinate to

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The “dictator’s endgame”: Explaining military behavior in nonviolent anti-incumbent mass protests

Cited by 46 publications

References 0 publications

Losing power safely: Explaining the variation in dictators' responses to anti‐regime protests

Losing power safely: Explaining the variation in dictators' responses to anti‐regime protests

How to Build Democracy after Authoritarian Breakdown: Insights from a Mixed Methods Approach

Civil-Military Relations: What Is the State of the Field

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