The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box

Abstract

Modern dictatorships hold elections. The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores the manners in which dictators design elections and the consequences of autocratic elections on political order. Dictators face a trade-off when designing elections: manipulated elections lose useful benefits that dictators can enjoy at the ballot box, but excessively transparent elections make it difficult to win big. With this electoral dilemma in mind, Higashijima argues that when the dictator has the capability of mobilizing public support through economic distribution, elections are less likely to be manipulated by blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Furthermore, when the autocrat deviates from the equilibrium of election design in dealing with the electoral dilemma, elections destabilize autocratic rule in the form of popular protests, coups d'état, and the opposition's election victories. The theory of autocratic elections developed in the book is tested on novel cross-national data of autocratic elections; various illustrations from autocracies around the globe; and structured, in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics-Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.