The Deviance in Deviant Causal Chains

Abstract

Abstract:Causal theories of action, perception and knowledge are each beset by problems of so-called 'deviant' causal chains. For each such theory, counterexamples are formed using odd or co-incidental causal chains to establish that the theory is committed to unpalatable claims about some intentional action, about a case of veridical perception or about the acquisition of genuine knowledge. In this paper I will argue that three well-known examples of a deviant causal chain have something in common: they each violate Yablos proportionality constraint on causation. I will argue that this constraint provides the key to saving causal theories from deviant chains.

Proportionality in Causation, Part II: Applications and Challenges

“…A related application of proportionality, which I don't have the space to discuss, is in excluding deviant causal chains(McDonnell, 2015).10 For some relevant recent discussion, seeKrämer and Roski (2017) and Hirèche (forthcoming). The arguments inDasgupta (2014) illustrate the proportionality constraint on metaphysical explanation in action.11Yablo (1992b, p. 423) also invokes the 'unity and integrity of the causal order': the idea that each event should have both many causes and many effects.…”

“…9 9 A related application of proportionality, which I don't have the space to discuss, is in excluding deviant causal chains (McDonnell, 2015). …”

An attempt at a general solution to the problem of deviant causal chains

“…More recent counterfactual approaches includeNoë (2003) andMcDonnell (2015) Tye (1982). andJackson (1977) offer sensitivity strategies, which require systematic variation between scene and experience.…”