The developmental and cultural psychology of free will

Kushnir, Tamar

doi:10.1111/phc3.12529

Cited by 47 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 115 publications

(114 reference statements)

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“…We do not presume to have provided an exhaustive review of such constraints. Indeed, there may be important other situational constraints that we have neglected to include here (such as sample characteristics of choice sets; Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Xu & Denison, 2009; see Kushnir, 2018, for a broader treatment of situational constraint in children’s beliefs about free will) and other constraints that have yet to be discovered. As children gain knowledge of the world from a range of sources, they can access and consider a wider range of constraints and situational limits.…”

Section: Discussion: How Situations Constrain Children’s Evaluations mentioning

confidence: 99%

Children’s Judgments of Epistemic and Moral Agents: From Situations to Intentions

Koenig

Tiberius

Hamlin

2019

Perspect Psychol Sci

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Children’s evaluations of moral and epistemic agents crucially depend on their discerning that an agent’s actions were performed intentionally. Here we argue that children’s epistemic and moral judgments reveal practices of forgiveness and blame, trust and mistrust, and objection or disapproval and that such practices are supported by children’s monitoring of the situational constraints on agents. Inherent in such practices is the understanding that agents are responsible for actions performed under certain conditions but not others. We discuss a range of situational constraints on children’s early epistemic and moral evaluations and clarify how these situational constraints serve to support children’s identification of intentional actions. By monitoring the situation, children distinguish intentional from less intentional action and selectively hold epistemic and moral agents accountable. We argue that these findings inform psychological and philosophical theorizing about attributions of moral and epistemic agency and responsibility.

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Section: Discussion: How Situations Constrain Children’s Evaluations mentioning

confidence: 99%

Children’s Judgments of Epistemic and Moral Agents: From Situations to Intentions

Koenig

Tiberius

Hamlin

2019

Perspect Psychol Sci

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“…However, there are reasons to believe that the prerequisite inferential and evaluative capacities for such understanding are present in early childhood. First, even infants can infer others' intentions and preferences from their choices (Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997;Phillips & Wellman, 2005;Woodward, 2009); some studies suggest that these inferences are made in light of alternative actions that are available to the actor in the context (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002;Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010;Kushnir, 2018;Pesowski, Denison, & Friedman, 2016). Toddlers and preschoolers are more likely to interpret an agent's choice as an indicator of her underlying preferences when the agent foregoes more probable alternative options and chooses a less probable option instead (Kushnir et al, 2010; see EVALUATIONS OF SOCIAL MINDFULNESS 7 also Gweon, Tenenbaum, & Schulz, 2010 for a similar sensitivity, but about inferring object properties).…”

Section: Evaluations Of Social Mindfulnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, the ability to simultaneously represent multiple possibilities seems to be in place by 4 years of age (Leahy & Carey, 2020). Such reasoning becomes more explicit by late preschool years; children readily evaluate their own and other people's helpfulness depending on the available alternative actions the actor could have taken (Gweon & Asaba, 2018;2018).…”

Section: Evaluations Of Social Mindfulnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Leaving a Choice for Others: Children’s Evaluations of Considerate, Socially-Mindful Actions

Xin¹,

Zhang²,

Gweon³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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People value those who act with others in mind even as they pursue their own goals. Across three studies (N=566; 4- to 6-year-olds), we investigated children’s developing understanding of such considerate, socially-mindful actions. By age 6, both U.S. and Chinese children positively evaluate a character who takes a snack for herself in a way that leaves snack choice for others over a character who leaves no choice (Study 1), but only when the actors had alternative possible actions (Study 2) and when a clear beneficiary was present (Study 3). These results suggest an emerging ability to infer underlying social intentions from self-oriented actions, providing insights into the role of social-cognitive capacities vs. culture-specific norms in children’s moral evaluations.

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“…That is, it may be misleading to refer to largely innate mechanisms for structuring experience as "intuitions", as these capacities may lack experiential content by not (yet) affording sufficient coherence for the generation of an experienceable world. Finally, agency-related knowledge may be particularly complex, diverse in its forms, and dependent upon experience for its development (Kushnir et al, 2015;Kushnir, 2018;Chernyak et al, 2019).…”

Section: Figure 1 From "An Integrated World Modeling Theory (Iwmt) Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) Revisited

Safron¹

2019

Preprint

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Here, I provide clarifications and discuss further issues relating to Safron (2020), “An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of consciousness: Combining Integrated Information and Global Workspace Theories with the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference Framework; towards solving the Hard problem and characterizing agentic causation.” As a synthesis of major theories of complex systems and consciousness, with IWMT we may be able to address some of the most difficult problems in the sciences. This is a claim deserving of close scrutiny and much skepticism. What would it take to solve the Hard problem? One could answer the question of how it is possible that something like subjectivity could emerge from objective brain functioning (i.e., moving from a third person to a first person ontology), but a truly satisfying account might still require solving all the “easy” and “real” problems of consciousness. In this way, IWMT does not claim to definitively solve the Hard problem, as explaining all the particular ways that things feel across all relevant aspects of experience is likely an impossible task. Nonetheless, IWMT does claim to have made major inroads into our understanding of consciousness, and here I will attempt to justify this position by discussing challenging problems and outstanding questions with respect to philosophy, (neuro)phenomenology, computational principles, practical applications, and implications for existing theories of mind and life.

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The developmental and cultural psychology of free will

Cited by 47 publications

References 115 publications

Children’s Judgments of Epistemic and Moral Agents: From Situations to Intentions

Children’s Judgments of Epistemic and Moral Agents: From Situations to Intentions

Leaving a Choice for Others: Children’s Evaluations of Considerate, Socially-Mindful Actions

Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) Revisited

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