The Development of American Finance

Konings, Martijn

doi:10.1017/cbo9781139015011

Cited by 96 publications

(44 citation statements)

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“…According to this literature governments made active decisions, on the basis of both domestic and international considerations, to liberalize domestic financial markets and eliminate capital controls (Block, 1977;Cohen, 1978;Helleiner, 1994;Kirshner, 1997;Strange, 1986;Underhill, 1991). Scholars have debated whether the US acted defensively (Frieden, 1987;Krampf, 2019) or whether, operating from a position of strength, it sought to project monetary and financial power (Gowan, 1999;Konings, 2011;Strange, 1987). Still others have emphasized the role of the International Monetary Fund (Abdelal, 2007;Copelovitch, 2010;Kentikelenis & Babb, 2019).…”

Section: Toward a Positive Integration Theory Of Financial Globalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financial globalization as positive integration: monetary technocrats and the Eurodollar market in the 1970s

Braun

Krampf

Murau

2020

Review of International Political Economy

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International political economy (IPE) has explained financial globalization as the result of states deciding to open up and liberalize domestic financial systems. Complementing this 'negative integration' view, we present a theory of financial globalization during the 1970s that emphasizes the importance of 'positive integration.' Credit money systems are characterized by public-private infrastructural entanglements, the management of which require substantial institutional work by monetary technocrats, both at the domestic and at the international level. To illustrate our theory, we trace the expansion of the Eurodollar market during the 1970s. Drawing on archival records from the 'Standing Committee on the Euro-currency Market' at the Bank for International Settlements, we show how this group of G-10 central bankers sought to elevate the management of infrastructural entanglements from the domestic to the international level. By ensuring that the Eurodollar market did not interfere with domestic monetary governability, while seeking to provide protection for issuers of Eurodollars, monetary technocrats helped establish the institutional infrastructure for the expansion and globalization of the offshore US dollar system.

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Section: Toward a Positive Integration Theory Of Financial Globalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financial globalization as positive integration: monetary technocrats and the Eurodollar market in the 1970s

Braun

Krampf

Murau

2020

Review of International Political Economy

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“…As Krippner (2011, p. 13) remarks: 'In short, there is a kind of instrumentalism lurking in some of these accounts that supplants the interests of the financial sector for the interests of the state or simply assumes these interests to be identical. ' Krippner (2011) is one of a few financialisation scholars (see also Seabrooke, 2006, Schwarz, 2009Konings, 2011) who has looked more closely at the role of the state. All of these authors look at the US and none of them, with the exception of Krippner (2011), has used more qualitative data sources such as insider interviews and documents.…”

Section: The Financialisation Of the Uk Economy And Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of the State in the Financialisation of the UK Economy

Davis

Walsh

2015

Political Studies

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This article looks at the role of UK governments in the financialisation of the British economy and its industry. It argues two things. First, the UK state has had a rather more active role here than most observers have acknowledged. Successive governments since the 1970s have not merely abandoned industry, they have handed much of its control to the financial sector. Second, a key part of this policy shift was linked to the rising power of the Treasury and its reshaping of the former Department of Trade and Industry in its own ideal economic policy image. This both boosted the City and disadvantaged industry, thus propelling the UK towards financialisation at a faster pace than almost all rival economies. The arguments are based on evidence from a mix of interviews with central actors, published insider accounts and an analysis of budget statements in the period 1976-2010.

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“…Financializationthe rise and rise of finance since the 1970shas brought new challenges for politics and economics, as finance has become socially privileged over other economic activities. During this epoch states and banks have cooperatively innovated to expand credit (Konings, 2011;Schwartz, 2008), increasing numbers of people participated in mundane finance, via savings and debt (Langley 2008), and governments successfully reaped both economic and political rewards of their participation (Seabrooke, 2006).…”

Section: Finance the Crash And The Uk Statementioning

confidence: 99%

Protesting Too Much: Alastair Darling's constructions after the Financial Crash

Walsh¹

2015

Critical Discourse Studies

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How did the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (the British Minister of Finance) publicly construct the economy after the Financial Crash, and why? Chancellor Alastair Darling's (2007-2010) rhetoric indicates how political elites represented the post-crash world for both themselves and subalterns. In his annual budget statements to Parliament, Darling talked about finance and mortgages much more, and taxation much less, than other chancellors. He constructed a vigorous defence of the financial sector and mortgage market, and comfortably described limited technical reforms. But as well as avoiding taxation as a topic, he appeared less comfortable and more inconsistent defending his taxation policies in public. Refusing to increase corporate or capital gains taxes, in his later budgets he argued that top-percentiles earners must pay more income tax, and that banks and tax evaders would pay more tax someday. This is a surprising elite characterization of top earners and taxation two and one years before Occupy would encamp at St. Paul's, which indicates that Darling understood the power of anti-elite critique. I argue that in his speech Darling was willing to sacrifice some limited and select elements of financial activity and taxation to criticism in order to protect fundamental aspects of the financial system, particularly the owned capital upon which it depends. Via an appropriation critical language about finance and the Crash, his rhetoric defensively protected owned capital and corporate profit from other claims.

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The Development of American Finance

Cited by 96 publications

References 0 publications

Financial globalization as positive integration: monetary technocrats and the Eurodollar market in the 1970s

Financial globalization as positive integration: monetary technocrats and the Eurodollar market in the 1970s

The Role of the State in the Financialisation of the UK Economy

Protesting Too Much: Alastair Darling's constructions after the Financial Crash

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