The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States

Ray, E. J.

doi:10.1086/260952

Cited by 207 publications

(113 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Our tests of the strict theories add to the voluminous empirical literature on protection that focused on heuristic or general factor endowment approaches, such as Ray (1981), Baldwin (1985), or Trefler (1993). Especially interesting is the comparison of our results to the findings of previous reduced form juxtapositions of endogenous tariff formation models in Gawande (1998).…”

mentioning

confidence: 61%

Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment

Eicher

Osang

2002

American Economic Review

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Do contributions levels matter for endogenous protection or is the existence of a lobby sufficient? Are lobbies' net benefits from protection identical to their contribution levels, or does the level of protection simply reflect contribution levels of supporters and opponents? We estimate the Influence Driven (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) and the Tariff Function (Findlay and Wellisz, 1982) models within a unified theoretical framework to examine the contrasting implications derived from these two prominent tariff formation models.We find strong evidence that protection is indeed "for sale." The important new result is, however, that not only the existence of lobbies matters, but also the relative size of the sectoral pro and anti protection contributions. Using J tests to compare the power of the models directly, we cannot reject the null of correct specification of the Influence Driven model and find evidence of some misspecification in the Tariff Function model.

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confidence: 61%

Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment

Eicher

Osang

2002

American Economic Review

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“…Finally, the results of this paper can be linked to the empirical literature on tariff liberalization and the emergence of NTBs. In particular, Marvel and Ray (1983) and Ray (1981Ray ( , 1987 have shown that, in some sectors, a net increase in protection has resulted from the emergence of NTBs, and that the degree of replacement, as well as the extent of tariff liberalization, critically depend on the characteristics of the industry.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization

Anderson

Schmitt

2003

Economic Inquiry

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION AbstractThis paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce nontariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from using tariffs only to quotas, and to antidumping constraints (when quotas are jointly eliminated). Second, there is a narrowing of the range of industries in which each instrument is used. Third, the degree of tariff liberalization and of replacement of tariffs by NTBs depend on industry characteristics. These results are roughly in line with the empirical evidence.

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“…"A neglected issue in the preceding comparison of nontariff barriers with tariffs is the distribution of these restrictions across industries. While Ray (1981) found that nontariff barriers and tariffs are biased toward industries in which the United States has a comparative disadvantage, he also found some maior differences. Tariffs are biased toward low-skill rather than capital-intensive industries and are unrelated to product heterogeneity and the geographical dispersion of domestic production facilities.…”

Section: Benefits To Other Partiesmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Thus, in this case, non-tariff barriers are simply a substitute for tariffs. In fact, research by Ray (1981) indicates that non-tariff barriers have been used to reverse the effects of multilateral tariff reductions negotiated under GATT.…”

Section: The Impact Of Gatt: An Institutional Constraint On the Use Omentioning

confidence: 99%

An Introduction to Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade

Coughlin¹,

Wood²

1989

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The Determinants of Tariff and Nontariff Trade Restrictions in the United States

Cited by 207 publications

References 7 publications

Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment

Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment

Nontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization

An Introduction to Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade

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