The Determinants of State-Level Antitrust Activity

Feinberg, Robert M.; Reynolds, Kara M.

doi:10.1007/s11151-010-9264-6

Cited by 20 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…However, during the George W. Bush presidency, a presidency also defined by its Chicago antitrust approach (Baker and Shapiro, 2008), there is a precipitous drop in the number of cartels prosecuted relative to Reagan (as well as Clinton and Obama). 8 In this paper we study U.S. federal cartel prosecution and do not examine state level enforcement as has been done by Feinberg and Reynolds (2010). prosecutions, particularly of cartels in which there is hard evidence of collusion. Most of the time within US antitrust enforcement, such hard evidence emerges from cooperation of a defecting cartel member via the leniency program (Hammond 2010).…”

Section: Literature On Cartel Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Assistant Attorney General, who heads the Antitrust Division, is appointed directly by the U.S. President, potentially setting the stage for shifts in enforcement with changes in the President and their specific priorities. 26 In alternative specifications we either use a Presidential dummy (Republican=1; Democrat=0), or include a dummy 23 Chen and Harrington (2007), Hammond (2004, 2010), and Motta (2004. 24 While these factors have transformed cartel enforcement, in the bigger picture these changes can be viewed as endogenous to broader shifts in intellectual thinking about cartel enforcement and the political willingness to prosecute (Baker, 2002;Ghosal, 2011b;and Kovacic and Shapiro, 2000).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions

Ghosal

Sokol²

2015

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993-2003, and 2004-2013. Our empirical estimates show significant variation in the number of cartels prosecuted and the penalties imposed across the policy regimes. The more recent regimes are characterized by far fewer cartels prosecuted, but with substantially higher penalties levied on firms and individuals. While effective deterrence is one explanation for these patterns, we are more inclined to conclude that US cartel enforcement has seen an underlying shift away from focusing on smaller cartels to larger and multinational firms. In terms of political effects, our results reveal no clear inter-political party effect on cartel prosecutions, but there appear to be interesting intra-political party effects. We find that particular Presidencies matter for cartel prosecutions, and variation across Presidential administrations led to marked shifts in the total number of cartels prosecuted. Overall, the shifts in the number of cartels prosecuted and penalties levied portray changing policy priorities and a search for the optimal enforcement design to curtail one of the clearest sources of welfare loss, collusion. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: K210, L410, L130, L110.

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Section: Literature On Cartel Enforcementmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions

Ghosal

Sokol²

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…14 As a result, our sample period ends in 2003 for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 14 As noted earlier, there has been some prior research on the determinants of EU competition policy. Feinberg and Reynolds (2010) discuss U.S. state level antitrust case determinants; while antitrust is an important enforcement activity for many state Attorneys General, the types of cases pursued and level of activity is clearly influenced by the presence of federal government enforcement efforts. Antitrust case information was obtained from competition agency websites, including the annual reports provided there, as well as additional enforcement data provided by staff at some of the agencies.…”

Section: Antitrust Institutions In Central and Eastern Europementioning

confidence: 99%

Maintaining New Markets: Explaining Antitrust Enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe

2011

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While others have examined the implementation and/or the stringency of enforcement of antitrust laws in post-socialist economies, this paper is the first study that attempts to explain the patterns of antitrust enforcement activity across post-socialist countries using economic and political variables. Using a panel of ten European postsocialist countries over periods ranging from 4 to 11 years, we find a number of significant factors associated with enforcement in these countries. For example, our results suggest that countries characterized by more unionization and less corruption tend to engage in greater antitrust enforcement of all types. Countries more successful in privatizing have filed fewer cases, while more affluent or developed countries investigate fewer cases of all types, consistent with an income-shifting motivation for antitrust. In general, countries have tended to increase their enforcement efforts over time.

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“…Feinberg and Reynolds (2010) discuss (and explain the determinants of) patterns of state antitrust filings over the past two decades, and Feinberg and Husted (2011) and Feinberg (2012) show that this enforcement, especially nonhorizontal cases, may be viewed by potential entrants as a negative aspect of the state business climate. What has not been examined is whether antitrust at the state level provides impetus for establishment exit.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%