The determinants of nonproliferation export controls: A membership‐fee explanation

Cupitt, Richard T.; Grillot, Suzette R.; Murayama, Yuzo

doi:10.1080/10736700108436851

Cited by 8 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…On the other hand, some research suggests that more stringent export controls help promote exports. Cupitt et al. (2001) take the view that export controls, although costly in economic terms, can be seen as a “membership fee” for access to the world’s liberal economic community.…”

Section: Empirical Testing and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In each case, dense webs of state and nonstate actors, operating on both sides of the law, deceived businesses into contributing technology to WMD programs. The programs depended heavily on imported items that were largely acquired using legitimate commercial channels as cover (Cupitt, Grillot, and Murayama 2001). Yet, in all these cases, the failure of supplier states to control dual‐use material proved to be the critical link to illicit proliferation.…”

Section: The Problem: Dual‐use Technology and Nonproliferation Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, this study addresses a different aspect of the supply‐side issue: the reasons why states take active steps to control their exports of dual‐use technology. Aside from a study conducted by Cupitt et al. (2001), there have been few systematic treatments of this subject.…”

Section: The Problem: Dual‐use Technology and Nonproliferation Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, it can be economically or politically costly. Implementing and administering export controls will impose financial costs on industry due to administrative burdens (Cupitt et al. 2001) and lost market share for exports (Beck and Gahlaut 2003).…”

Section: Explaining Compliance: Interests and Capacitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls

Stinnett¹,

Early

Horne

et al. 2011

International Studies Perspectives

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The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in 2004 reflects an emerging consensus that more should be done by the international community to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. UNSCR 1540 articulates a universal, legally binding obligation for all states to confront proliferation by adopting effective export control systems. To date, however, there have been no attempts to systematically analyze compliance with this new obligation, making it impossible to assess the success of this measure and the underlying causes of any shortcomings. This study addresses this by conducting a systematic empirical analysis of state compliance with UNSCR 1540. Drawing upon theories of compliance with international law, we investigate two distinct explanations for variation in the degree to which states adopt nonproliferation export controls: one based on state interests and enforcement and the other based on state capacity. Our statistical tests of these theories use a new, cross-national data set detailing the nonproliferation policies of 30 states. The empirical results indicate that compliance with international nonproliferation obligations is influenced most by a state's economic and governmental capacities and has little to do with interest-based factors. These findings suggest that capacity-building programs are the best option for improving the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and of nonproliferation efforts in general.

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Section: Empirical Testing and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Problem: Dual‐use Technology and Nonproliferation Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Problem: Dual‐use Technology and Nonproliferation Normsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Explaining Compliance: Interests and Capacitymentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls

Stinnett¹,

Early

Horne

et al. 2011

International Studies Perspectives

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The second approach sees compliance failures as a function of limited capacity and capability-rather than political will. In an early study of national export control systems, Cupitt, Grillot, and Murayama (2001) proposed a framework based on an economic-rationalist perspective to describe the conditions when states are likely to implement internationally compatible export controls. The framework explained why states implement export control systems in terms of maximizing the political and economic benefits of belonging to a liberal international community.…”

Section: The Supply Side Of Wmd Counterproliferationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Going it alone: The causes and consequences of U.S. extraterritorial counterproliferation enforcement

Arnold

Salisbury

2019

Contemporary Security Policy

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Targeting profits: The economic impact of arms embargoes on defense companies

Klomp

2024

Journal of Policy Modeling

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The determinants of nonproliferation export controls: A membership‐fee explanation

Cited by 8 publications

References 21 publications

Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls

Complying by Denying: Explaining Why States Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls

Going it alone: The causes and consequences of U.S. extraterritorial counterproliferation enforcement

Targeting profits: The economic impact of arms embargoes on defense companies

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