The determinants of multilateral bargaining: a comprehensive analysis of Baron and Ferejohn majoritarian bargaining experiments

Abstract

We collected and analyzed the data sets of all majoritarian Baron and Ferejohn (1989 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.) experiments through 2018. By exploiting the variation of experimental parameters such as group size and discount factor we are able to test whether or not the theoretical point predictions and comparative statics hold and find virtually no support for the theory. Novel findings are reported about the effect of group size and discounting on distribution of the surplus, the proposer's share, agreement delay, and voting behavior. We also report on off-equilibrium behavior (after subjects fail to agree) and identify strong history-dependent behavior in the form of punishment and loyalty to previous proposers.

Recognition probability in legislative bargaining

“…Our study belongs to the substantial body of experimental literature that tests the theoretical predictions of the Baron-Ferejohn model. Our experiment confirms many common patterns in previous experiments, as identified in Baranski and Morton (2022)'s meta-analysis: experienced subjects propose minimal winning coalitions and reach an agreement without delay as predicted, although the withincoalition allocations are more equal than predicted.…”

“…In line with the general findings from BF bargaining experiments Baranski and Morton, 2022), we find that the most experienced subjects propose a minimal winning coalition (exactly one member receives a zero offer). Figure 3 shows how the distribution of coalition types proposed in the first period evolves over time.…”

“…The selection of coalition partner conditional on proposing a MWC also becomes more consistent with the BF prediction over time, in line with other experimental findings (Baranski and Morton, 2022). Figure 4 shows the upward trends in the fraction of MWC offers made to the non-proposing member with the smaller recognition probability, as predicted by the BF model.…”

“…Most experiments also assume symmetric recognition probability, which is not appropriate to test for the potentially adverse effect that higher recognition probability could have. Although most qualitative predictions of the BF model find support in these experiments, another robust finding is that the proposer offers more than the theory predicts (Baranski and Morton, 2022). Given that the negative value of recognition probability critically hinges on the proposer choosing a coalition partner that allows maximal rent extraction, such generous offers raise the question of whether the proposer would necessarily choose the coalition partner with the smaller recognition probability.…”

Public good bargaining under mandatory and discretionary rules: experimental evidence

“…Our paper is most closely related to the experimental literature on coalitional and legislative bargaining; see, e.g. Palfrey (2015) and Baranski and Morton (2022) for surveys. John Kagel has made many pioneering contributions to this literature including Fréchette et al (2003), Fréchette et al (2005a,b,c), Fréchette et al (2012) and Baranski and Kagel (2015).…”