The Desire You Are Required to Get Rid of: A Functionalist Analysis of Desire in the Bhagavadgītā

Abstract

Niskamakarma is generally understood nonliterally as action done without desire of a certain sort. It is argued here that all desires are prohibited by niskamakarma. Two objections are considered: 1 desire is a necessary condition of action, and 2 the Indian tradition as a whole accepts desire as a necessary condition of action. A distinction is drawn here between a goal and a desire, and it is argued that goals-not desires-are entailed by action, and that the Indian tradition accepts goals-not desires-as a necessary condition of action.

Good and Bad Desires: Implications of the Dialogue between Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna

“…We may be compelled to do certain works for the maintenance of the body, but even that is a subjection to the desire of the body" (102). I argue elsewhere (Framarin 2006b), however, that the Bhagavad G tå advocates acting without any desire at all. Chakrabarti (1988) ultimately takes this position as well.…”

“…Anyone who has taught the Bhagavad G tå to undergraduates can testify to the skepticism with which they receive the doctrine of ni‚kåmakarma. I argue that this is a mistake, however (see Framarin 2004Framarin , 2006b). If one acts intentionally, then it follows that one has a reason (or at least believes one has a reason) for doing what one does.…”

“…There is seemingly strong evidence for this kind of view in the Bhagavad G tå itself, especially 3.39, which characterizes the desire (kåma) to be gotten rid of as an insatiable fire (duçp¨renånalena). See also Framarin (2006b).…”

The Bhagavad Gita’s Ethical Syncretism

“…Such a view is broadly supported in the scholarship, most recently byChatterjea (2002), though there are exceptions, such asFramarin (2006) who I discuss more fully below. Yet there is more to detachment than not being concerned with personal consequences, as my discussion in section 3 will show.…”

An Analysis of Consequentialism and Deontology in the Normative Ethics of the Bhagavadgītā

“…Arjuna is expected to detach himself not merely from desires regarding advantages strictly for himself but also from desires for such advantages for, say, Yudhiṡṫhira, whom he cares about, and whose personal advantages are thus an extension of his own. Detailed analyses of the concept of desire in its relation to the ethical psychology suggested by the doctrine of detached action in the Gītā may be found in Framarin (2004Framarin ( , 2006Framarin ( , 2007. Framarin's argument that there can be motivations for actions that are not desires, and that it is exclusively such motivations that Krishna expects an agent to have (see Framarin 2004), cannot be treated here, but that argument is compatible with the view that what the Argument from Detached Action proposes is a consequentialism: the difference would merely be that the consequence prescribed for an agent's action is, under the moderate view, something that the agent has reason to desire to bring about, while, under Framarin's view, it is something that ought to motivate the agent's actions desirelessly.…”