The Design of the Incentive Contract of Venture Capital under Asymmetric Information

Zou, Huiwen; Xizhi, Zhou

doi:10.1109/bife.2011.123

Cited by 2 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In venture capital sphere, the entrepreneur's effort and ability are the determinants of income function [17]. In addition, we believe that the potential market value can affect the income function of the venture capital and the concerning effort and ability, that it is not possible to increase the level of effort and ability indefinitely.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Contracting and monitoring efforts can improve the portfolio performance by reducing possible losses caused by moral hazard and adverse selection [16]. Optimal contract arrangement can overcome the revenue conflict between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs and reach mutually motivating conditions [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Zou and Zhou presented their optimal contract model based on the fact that both capitalists and entrepreneurs target at maximizing their own revenue. They also designed an optimal contract for short-and long-term venture capitals from perspectives of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs [17].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…the risk aversion coefficient of venture capitalist and of his/her risk, and u  is the risk aversion coefficient of entrepreneur and his/her risk[17].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The equilibrium of venture capital incentive contract: Optimization and Q-learning approaches

Rezaei

Rastegar

2020

Scientia Iranica

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This paper presents an incentive contract model for allocating the income of venture projects. Venture Capital (VC), as one of the main sources of financing innovative projects, faces challenges like moral hazards, information asymmetry and interest conflicts (three agency problems). In addition to identifying the items that may affect the income of venture projects and the introduction of cost functions, we present an optimal incentive contract model from the perspective of both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. In this model, a venture capitalist, as an active investor, provides managerial and training assistance to the entrepreneur. The results showed that the higher the initial ability of the entrepreneur, the less money the venture capitalist pays for training. Furthermore, the wealth that the contract parties can obtain if the venture contract is not accepted, is an influential factor in the contract payment function. This model has also been studied with bounded rationality hypothesis and has been implemented using the Qlearning algorithm. In addition, the results obtained from the Q-learning approach, are reasonably convergent with the Nash equilibrium.

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…the risk aversion coefficient of venture capitalist and of his/her risk, and u  is the risk aversion coefficient of entrepreneur and his/her risk[17].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The equilibrium of venture capital incentive contract: Optimization and Q-learning approaches

Rezaei

Rastegar

2020

Scientia Iranica

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“…""" uQ=kD sOa \}=QW [11] "OvwW QDCNU =@ =y|}=Q=O VRQ= uOQm pOt |wQ xr=kt u}OvJ Oa@ x@ 2000 p=U R= Qw]x@ Ov=wD|tv R= AwD GwQN "CU= XNWt=v C@Uv =@ |mWt w OQR AwD 60 w RtQk AwD 30 'uwo=vwo |=yVQov =@ O= Qi= w OQw;|t OwHw x@ = Q u=v}t]= sOa \}=QW u=Oro u}= 1986 12 QFw} Qv=m w EQ=owy [12] "OvyO|t RwQ@ OwN R= = Q |Dw=iDt |=yVvm=ẁ @=wD h} QaD |= Q@ |D=aq]= xvwoI}y uDW=Ov |Q@N|@ u}@ |v=}t Cr=L l} = Q s=y@= [13] 13 u= Q=mty w VHvU`@=D QO = Q s=y@= x@ O= Qi= VQov u=wD|t xm OvOQm u=}@ Q=@u}rw= |= Q@ w OvO=O %OwW|t h} QaD Q} R pmW x@ jr]t C@=F |R}Qos=y@= =@ ;`@=D [14] ; 0 n (x) C@Uv [15] [11] '2011 wS w wR |xar=]t |x}=B Q@ ? }DQD u}= x@ "OR=U xv}W}@ w= |= Q@ = Q 16…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

طراحی قرارداد انگیزشی بهینه در شرایط عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی برای سرمایه‌گذاری خطرپذیر با تأکید بر ابهام‌گریزی دوطرف

رستگار¹,

شریفی²,

رضایی³

2019

مهندسی صنایع و مدیریت

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Qk 's=y@= 'uQ=kDt=v C=aq]= 'Q}PBQ]N |Q=Pox}=tQU %|O}rm u=oS=w "p=ai |Q=Pox}=tQU '|WR}ov= xtOkt "1 "OwWs=Hv= w= Q_v OQwtpta =D Ovm O=H}= w= QO = Q |i=m xR}ov= =} Q=O=w = Q u} Qi;Q=m wLv =}; xm OwW ut]t =D Ovm p=@vO xv=RwQ Qw]x@ = Q u} Qi;Q=m C=t=Ok= Ov=wD|tv Q=Pox}=tQU Q=Os=yU u}=Q@=v@ &xv =} CUy Q=Pox}=tQU`i=vt =@ j@]vt 'u}Qi; Q=m |=y|Q}os}tYD Kq]Y= QO = Q Cr=L u}= "CU= u} Qi;Q=m C=}rta XwYN QO sRq C=aq]= Ok=i Q=Pox}=tQU u}@ xrUt u}= pL |= Q@ "Ovt=v|t |D=aq]= uQ=kD sOa '|oOv}=tv |x}Q_v |v}@V}B C}y=t "OwW|t xO=iDU= xv}y@ O=OQ= Qk |x}Q_v ?wJQ=J R= u} Qi;Q=m w u} Qi;Q=m C=t=Ok= |xv= RwQ |Q}o|B QO Q=Pox}=tQU |v=wD=v w O=OQ= Qk |xOv}; uOw@ Q}PB=v |=yQ=my= Q CU= xOW Ea=@ 'hQ]wO ORv |D=aq]= uQ=kD sOa RwQ@ u; |xH}Dv QO w =D OwW xDiQo Q=mx@ O=OQ= Qk O=it u} wOD QO |vwo =vwo |rQDvm w |WR}ov= 'xv= Q}oV}B OwHwt |=yKQ] QO Q}PB Q]N u= Q=Pox}=tQU "OwW xOv=UQ pk=OL x@ |D; |=yVr=J '|Q=Pox}=tQU Q@xwqa xm |vat u}O@ 'Ovvm|t p=ai |Q=Pox}=tQU OwN jwOvY QO V}=Ri= = Q u=v}Qi; Q=m Vv=O '|D}Q}Ot |=yltm w |WRwt; |=yxQwO |Q= RoQ@ =@ |=yCmQW |=yCw=iD R= |m} "OvwW|t u=v; |}=v=wD K]U CiQW}B Ea=@ w xO=O |=yltm u}ty R}v |Q}os=w VwQ x@ |r=t u}t -=D x@ C@Uv Q}PB Q]N |Q=Pox}=tQU |=yh}QaD xm CU= u} Ro}=H |=y|Q=Pox}=tQU`=wv= R= |m} Q}PB Q]N |Q=Pox}=tQU u}@ |yHwD p@=k Cw=iD w OvQ=O Cy@=Wt |O=}R OQ=wt QO h} Q=aD QDW}@ "OQ=O |OOaDt |Q=Pox}=tQU 'Q}PBQ]N |Q=Pox}=tQU Cio u=wD|t |rm CQwY x@ "OQ=Ov OwHw =yu; sDU}U =} Ov}=Qi 'pwYLt O}rwD |= Q@ xv=Qw;wv |}xO}= |= Q=O xm CU=B wv CmQW l} QO =} xW}Ov= p}O@D Q}PB Q]N |Q=Pox}=tQU hOy "CU= |r@k |xk@=U uDW=O uwO@ O}OH 'Q}PBQ]N |Q=Pox}=tQU Ov}=Qi QO =yVr=J u} QDsyt R= |m} [1] "CU= CQ=HD x@ xO}= hQ]wOR=l}QyQ}PBQ]N|Q=Pox}=tQU|=yO=OQ= Qk QO"CU=|oOv}=tv|xrUtRwQ@ u}@ CU= umtt wQu}= R= "Ovvm pta OwN |YNW`i=vt |=DU= Q QO Ovv=wD|t O=OQ= Qk = Q u; xm O}; OwHw x@ O=[D u} Qi;Q=m |YNW`i=vt w Q=Pox}=tQU`i=vt uOW xv}W}@ x@ xHwD =@ xm CU= u}= |rY=`w[wt u}=Q@=v@ "Ovt=v|t |oOv}=tv |xrUt =} pmWt u} QDy@ x@ Ov=wD|t Q=Pox}=tQU xvwoJ 'OQ=O OwHw u} Qi;Q=m Q@CQ=_v QO xm |DqmWt

show abstract

The Design of the Incentive Contract of Venture Capital under Asymmetric Information

Cited by 2 publications

References 6 publications

The equilibrium of venture capital incentive contract: Optimization and Q-learning approaches

The equilibrium of venture capital incentive contract: Optimization and Q-learning approaches

طراحی قرارداد انگیزشی بهینه در شرایط عدم تقارن اطلاعاتی برای سرمایه‌گذاری خطرپذیر با تأکید بر ابهام‌گریزی دوطرف

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