The Design of Compact SM4 Encryption and Decryption Circuits That Are Resistant to Bypass Attack

Abstract

<jats:p>In order to achieve the purpose of defending against side channel attacks, a compact SM4 circuit was designed based on the mask and random delay technique, and the linear transformation module was designed with random insertion of the pseudo operation method. By analyzing the glitch data generated by the S-box of SM4 with different inputs, the security against glitch attacks was confirmed. Then, the DPA (Differential Power Analysis) was performed on the designed circuit. The key could not be successfully obtained even in the case of 100,000 power curves, so that the safety of SM4 against DPA is verified. Finally, using Synopsys DC (Design Compiler, Mountain View, CA94043DC, USA) to synthesize the designed circuit, the results show that the area of the designed circuit in the SMIC 0.18 process is 82,734 μm2, which is 48% smaller than results reported in other papers.</jats:p>

Side-Channel Attack of Lightweight Cryptography Based on MixColumn: Case Study of PRINCE

“…In practical applications, cryptography needs to consider countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks (SCA). Researchers have successfully implemented SCA on the hardware circuit of traditional cryptography in [8][9][10][11][12][13]. Their attack points are focused on the times when registers are updated before and after.…”