The Denotation of Copredicative Nouns

Abstract

Copredication is the phenomenon whereby two or more predicates seem to require that their argument denotes different things. The denotation of words that copredicate has been broadly discussed. In this paper, I investigate the metaphysics behind this question. Thus, mereological theories of dot objects claim that these nouns denote complex entities; Asher (Lexical meaning in context, Cambridge University Press, 2011, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511793936) thinks that they denote bare particulars; and the Activation Package Theory contends that they stand for multiple denotations. According to the Activation Package Theory, copredicative nouns stand for complex knowledge structures that offer a range of multiple potential denotations. In this paper, I claim that the Activation Package Theory contributes to solve some of the metaphysical questions that arise from copredication.

Copredication, Davidson and Logical Form

“…If sentences like ( 2)-( 7) involve genuine polysemy, then perhaps the first thought that might strike us is that their logical form must involve more than one referring expression, if the sentences are capable of being true. Ortega-Andrés and Vicente (2019) (see also Vicente, 2021a, andOrtega-Andres, 2022) defend such a view. The underlying structure of copredicative sentences is not the central concern of Ortega-Andrés and Vicente, who are primarily focussed on providing a psychological account which can explain why some copredicative sentences sound unexceptional and possibly true to us, while others sound heavily zeugmatic.…”

Mental simulation and language comprehension: The case of copredication

“…It has been used by theorists like Chomsky (2000) to argue against referential semantics and the idea that word meaning is a denotation stable across contexts (see also Collins, 2017; Pietroski, 2005; Vicente, 2021a). This discussion in turn led to various proposals aimed at explaining copredication as a topic in its own right (for recent discussion, see Gotham, 2017; Liebesman & Magidor, 2017, 2019; Ortega‐Andrés & Vicente, 2019; Vicente, 2021b; Löhr & Michel, 2022; Ortega‐Andrés, 2022).…”

“…Each of these accounts nevertheless faces criticism (see Liebesman & Magidor, 2019; Ortega‐Andrés, 2022; Vicente, 2021b; Viebahn, 2022). It may be that proponents of these ontological accounts can address the respective objections.…”

“…But while some copredicational constructions involving polysemous words result in oddness, others do not. What precisely explains this difference in felicitousness has generated much discussion (e.g., Collins, 2017; Löhr & Michel, 2022; Ortega‐Andrés, 2022; Ortega‐Andrés & Vicente, 2019; Quilty‐Dunn, 2021; Vicente, 2021b). In this article, I argue that the simulation view of language comprehension can shed light on this linguistic phenomenon and improve on previous discussions of copredication.…”