The Demand Elasticity Impacts on the Strategic Bidding Behavior of the Electricity Producers

Bompard, Ettore; Ma, Yuanlin; Napoli, Roberto; Abrate, Graziano

doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2006.889134

Cited by 133 publications

(94 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Also by (14) and u * l specified in (13), we haved −l,t + l u * lt = w l at each of instants t ∈  l ; then we havê…”

Section: Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game‐Based Valley‐Fill Charging Coordination for Large‐Population Plug‐in Electric Vehicles

Ma¹,

Ran²

2014

Asian Journal of Control

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Charging coordination of large-population autonomous plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) in the power grid can be formulated as a class of constrained optimization problems. To overcome the computational complexity, a game-based method is proposed for the charging problems of the PEV population, which is composed of homogeneous subpopulations, such that individuals update their best charging strategies simultaneously with respect to a common electricity price determined by the total demand. To mitigate the oscillation behavior caused by the greedy behavior for the cheap electricity by individuals, a deviation cost is introduced to penalize against the deviation of the individual strategy from the average value of the homogeneous subpopulation. By adopting a proper deviation cost and following a best strategy update mechanism, the game systems may converge to the socially optimal valley-fill Nash equilibrium. Simulation examples are studied to illustrate the results.

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“…Also by (14) and u * l specified in (13), we haved −l,t + l u * lt = w l at each of instants t ∈  l ; then we havê…”

Section: Theoremmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game‐Based Valley‐Fill Charging Coordination for Large‐Population Plug‐in Electric Vehicles

Ma¹,

Ran²

2014

Asian Journal of Control

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“…In order to assess the impact of DRPs on power system studies, multifarious models are developed in recent years. Economic models of responsive loads based on the concept of constant price elasticity have been addressed in references [8]- [12]. Schweppes and his co-workers developed the concept of spot pricing of electricity to evaluate variable 4 costs of electric energy on an hourly basis and proposed three responsive load models, namely linear, potential and exponential demand functions [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Negawatt Demand Response Resource Modeling and Prioritizing in Power Markets

2017

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In recent years, integrated use of demand-and supply-side resources has been performed by electric utilities, because of its potential attractiveness, both at operation and economic levels. Demand Response Resources (DRRs) can be used as demand side options which are the consequence of implementing Demand Response Programs (DRPs). DRPs comprise the actions taken by end-use customers to reduce their electricity consumption in response to electricity market's high prices; and/or reliability problems on the electricity network. In this paper, a dynamic economic model of DRPs is derived based upon the concept of flexible elasticity of demand and the customer benefit function. Precise modeling of these virtual negawatt resources helps system operators to investigate the impact of responsive loads on power system studies. This paper also aims to prioritize multifarious DRPs by means of

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“…Compared to other commodity markets, demand elasticity in the electricity is low, but even a small increase can result in appreciable improvement of the market performance [5].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of the programs for demand response incentives in competitive electricity markets

Bompard

Napoli

Wan

2008

Int Trans Elec Energy Syst

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SUMMARYThe special features of electricity such as non-storability and lack of good substitutes, the network related market power and the demand inelasticity result in high volatile electricity prices in pool markets, especially during peak hours. Demand response (DR) programs with the aid of distributed energy resources (DER) provide the means to increase demand elasticity and, as a consequence, to counteract the effect of market power.This paper aims to assess the effectiveness of DR programs and try to answer to what extend DR programs will increase the demand elasticity and to what degree it will reduce the market power. Two DR programs, that is, time of use (TOU) rate and economic load response program (ELRP) are considered in this paper and the possible price responsiveness of load is modeled as linearly correlated to the difference of day and night TOU rate and the compensation price of load curtailment in order to determine the demand elasticity frontier. Game theory is employed to model the strategic bidding of generation companies (GenCos) and the Lerner index is used to quantify the market power. The proposed model is applied in Italian electricity market for numerical study.

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The Demand Elasticity Impacts on the Strategic Bidding Behavior of the Electricity Producers

Cited by 133 publications

References 22 publications

Game‐Based Valley‐Fill Charging Coordination for Large‐Population Plug‐in Electric Vehicles

Game‐Based Valley‐Fill Charging Coordination for Large‐Population Plug‐in Electric Vehicles

Dynamic Negawatt Demand Response Resource Modeling and Prioritizing in Power Markets

The effect of the programs for demand response incentives in competitive electricity markets

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