The Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect

Lassiter, G. Daniel; Lindberg, Matthew J.; González‐Vallejo, Claudia; Bellezza, Francis S.; Phillips, Nathaniel D.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02347.x

Cited by 79 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 16 publications

(19 reference statements)

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“…Across different sub-fields of psychology, a diverse set of dual-process models have been proposed, including analytic vs. heuristic (Kahneman, 2011, Evans, 2008, Evans and Stanovich, 2013, Evans, 2003), conscious vs. unconscious (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006, Lassiter et al., 2009), associative versus rule based (Ashby & O'Brien, 2005), goal-directed vs. habitual (Dickinson, 1985), cognitive vs. affective (Bechara et al., 1997), and reflective (C-system) vs. reflexive (X-system) models (Lieberman, 2007). Recently, there have been discussions about how stress modulates leaning and decision making through the lens of duality models.…”

Section: A Stress Induced Deliberation-to-intuition (Sidi) Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stress potentiates decision biases: A stress induced deliberation-to-intuition (SIDI) model

2016

Neurobiology of Stress

124

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Humans often make decisions in stressful situations, for example when the stakes are high and the potential consequences severe, or when the clock is ticking and the task demand is overwhelming. In response, a whole train of biological responses to stress has evolved to allow organisms to make a fight-or-flight response. When under stress, fast and effortless heuristics may dominate over slow and demanding deliberation in making decisions under uncertainty. Here, I review evidence from behavioral studies and neuroimaging research on decision making under stress and propose that stress elicits a switch from an analytic reasoning system to intuitive processes, and predict that this switch is associated with diminished activity in the prefrontal executive control regions and exaggerated activity in subcortical reactive emotion brain areas. Previous studies have shown that when stressed, individuals tend to make more habitual responses than goal-directed choices, be less likely to adjust their initial judgment, and rely more on gut feelings in social situations. It is possible that stress influences the arbitration between the emotion responses in subcortical regions and deliberative processes in the prefrontal cortex, so that final decisions are based on unexamined innate responses. Future research may further test this ‘stress induced deliberation-to-intuition’ (SIDI) model and examine its underlying neural mechanisms.

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Section: A Stress Induced Deliberation-to-intuition (Sidi) Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stress potentiates decision biases: A stress induced deliberation-to-intuition (SIDI) model

2016

Neurobiology of Stress

124

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“…This series of experiments is being met by a burst of experimental critiquese.g., Lassiter et al, 2009;Rey et al, 2009;Waroquier et al, 2009. In essence, these experiments consist of failures to replicate and the identification of experimental biases.…”

Section: Unconscious Thinking-decision?mentioning

confidence: 96%

What should be the roles of conscious states and brain states in theories of mental activity?FNx08

Dulany

2011

Mens Sana Monogr

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Answers to the title’s question have been influenced by a history in which an early science of consciousness was rejected by behaviourists on the argument that this entails commitment to ontological dualism and “free will” in the sense of indeterminism. This is, however, a confusion of theoretical assertions with metaphysical assertions. Nevertheless, a legacy within computational and information-processing views of mind rejects or de-emphasises a role for consciousness. This paper sketches a mentalistic metatheory in which conscious states are the sole carriers of symbolic representations, and thus have a central role in the explanation of mental activity and action-while specifying determinism and materialism as useful working assumptions. A mentalistic theory of causal learning, experimentally examined with phenomenal reports, is followed by examination of these questions: Are there common roles for phenomenal reports and brain imaging? Is there defensible evidence for unconscious brain states carrying symbolic representations? Are there interesting dissociations within consciousness?

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“…Lassiter et al . (2009[49]), for example, concluded that “Such judgments are ultimately a product of conscious rather than unconscious thought” (p. 361).In Newell & Shanks (in press[53]), there is a detailed and important set of methodological critiques of research purporting to find “unconscious influences on decision-making” in three paradigms usually labelled multiple cue judgement, deliberation-without-attention, and decision under uncertainty. The authors find a tendency to accept unconscious influences despite inadequate assessment of awareness and various ignored artefacts.…”

Section: What Consciousness Explains?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lassiter et al . (2009[49]), for example, concluded that “Such judgments are ultimately a product of conscious rather than unconscious thought” (p. 361).…”

Section: What Consciousness Explains?mentioning

confidence: 99%

What Explains Consciousness? Or...What Consciousness Explains?

Dulany

2014

Mens Sana Monogr

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In this invited commentary I focus on the topic addressed in three papers: De Sousa's (2013[1617]) Toward an Integrative Theory of Consciousness, a monograph with Parts 1 & 2, as well as commentaries by Pereira (2013a[59]) and Hirstein (2013[42]). All three are impressively scholarly and can stand—and shout—on their own. But theory of consciousness? My aim is to slice that topic into the two fundamentally different kinds of theories of consciousness, say what appears to be an ideology, out of behaviourism into cognitivism, now also influencing the quest for an “explanation of consciousness” in cognitive neuroscience. I will then say what can be expected given what we know of the complexity of brain structure, the richness of a conscious “vocabulary”, and current technological limits of brain imaging. This will then turn to the strategy for examining “what consciousness explains”—metatheory, theories, mappings, and a methodology of competitive support, a methodology especially important where there are competing commitments. There are also increasingly common identifications of methodological bias in, along with failures to replicate, studies reporting unconscious controls in decision, social priming—as there have been in perception, learning, problem solving, etc. The literature critique has provided evidence taken as reducing, and in some cases eliminating, a role for conscious controls—a position consistent with that ideology out of behaviourism into cognitivism. It is an ideological position that fails to recognize the fundamental distinction between theoretical and metaphysical assertions.

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The Deliberation-Without-Attention Effect

Cited by 79 publications

References 16 publications

Stress potentiates decision biases: A stress induced deliberation-to-intuition (SIDI) model

Stress potentiates decision biases: A stress induced deliberation-to-intuition (SIDI) model

What should be the roles of conscious states and brain states in theories of mental activity?FNx08

What Explains Consciousness? Or...What Consciousness Explains?

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