The Deep Crisis of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament: The State of Play and the Challenges

Neuneck, Götz

doi:10.1080/25751654.2019.1701796

Cited by 15 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Several practitioners have interpreted the co-occurrence of ambitious nuclear arms control and the end of the Cold War as proof that disarmament can only take place if the right security conditions are in place (e.g., Ford, 2019). Along similar lines, it has been suggested that the conclusion of New START in 2010 was made possibly be the evolution of a benign security environment between 2008 and 2014, characterized by Dmitry Medvedev's presidency of the Russian Federation and the Obama administration's efforts at "resetting" the U.S.-Russian relationship (see e.g., Neuneck, 2019). There is little doubt that disarmament is more difficult to achieve in a context of heightened tension and rivalry.…”

Section: Nuclear Stockpile Reductions and Limitations On Deploymentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A theory of nuclear disarmament: Cases, analogies, and the role of the non-proliferation regime

Egeland

2021

Contemporary Security Policy

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What might prompt a nuclear-armed state to give up its arsenal? Nuclear disarmament has provided a nominally shared goal for virtually all the world's states for decades, yet surprisingly little effort has been devoted to systematically theorizing its drivers. This article aims to begin filling this void. I proceed in three steps. First, I discuss the conceptual, material, and ideational features of renunciation to arrive at a rudimentary understanding of what, fundamentally, nuclear disarmament as a political process involves. Second, I scope out the empirical evidence on which a general theory of nuclear renunciation might be based. Third, synthesizing the dominant explanations for the cases discussed in the second part, I outline a basic account of nuclear relinquishment and discuss the compatibility of this account with common assumptions about disarmament practice. I conclude that the best evidence available suggests that adversarial politics and stigmatization are necessary conditions for renunciation. KEYWORDS Nuclear disarmament; theory; case studies; analogies; norms; adversarial politics Nuclear disarmament is one of the United Nations' oldest aspirations. The goal of abolition commands large popular support across continents (Baron et al., 2020;Egeland & Pelopidas, 2021; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2020; Kafura, 2020), and has for half a century constituted a legally binding obligation under the near universally approved Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Yet we know relatively little about the drivers of nuclear relinquishment, and there is no consensus about how the elimination of nuclear arms might be accomplished in practice. In one scholar's estimation, "[t]he political dynamics of nuclear disarmament are under-studied and under-theorised" (Burford, 2016, p. 1). In the words of another: "There is no theory of nuclear disarmament"

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Section: Nuclear Stockpile Reductions and Limitations On Deploymentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A theory of nuclear disarmament: Cases, analogies, and the role of the non-proliferation regime

Egeland

2021

Contemporary Security Policy

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“…It should also be noted that the reactor designs in Eastern Europe cannot accept enriched uranium without RF-exported fuel rods. The RF was also the beneficiary of 5000 nuclear warheads from Ukraine, with the originally intended aim of processing and repurposing them for peaceful civilian nuclear power uses and subsequently shipping these back to Ukraine (1994 Accord) . The U.S.A. paid for the processing and shipment.…”

Section: Analysis Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The RF was also the beneficiary of 5000 nuclear warheads from Ukraine, with the originally intended aim of processing and repurposing them for peaceful civilian nuclear power uses and subsequently shipping these back to Ukraine (1994 Accord). 52 The U.S.A. paid for the processing and shipment. However, it is unclear if all of these nuclear materials were indeed shipped back to Ukraine.…”

Section: ■ Analysis Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Energy Security and Sustainability for the European Union after/during the Ukraine Crisis: A Perspective

Liu

Wong

et al. 2023

Energy Fuels

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The special military operation initiated by the Russian Federation (RF) against Ukraine has focused on the European Union (EU) and, to a lesser degree, U.S. fossil fuel resource dependency. The Russian Federation's economy is heavily geared toward exports of carbonbased fuels. As a result of the proximity of the EU and Ukraine, these two entities are the largest importers of RF fossil fuels. Ukraine's and EU's large population and heavy industries utilize energy in large quantities. As a result of the overreliance on Russian carbon energy imports, the overall energy security index of the EU dropped by approximately 1−1.5% over the last 20 years. The energy security index can positively correlate with greenhouse emissions or a composite unit considering gas reserves and carbon dioxide emissions. To improve the EU energy security index, the EU imposed several phase-out energy bans in coordination with the U.K., U.S., Canada, Japan, and Australia in response to the ongoing crisis. An energy balance analysis demonstrates that an attractive option, namely, a hydrogen (H 2 ) infrastructure upgrade at the EU regional level, is feasible. The infrastructure upgrade at the regional level could generate an energy equivalent substitution of 20 exajoules (1 × 10 18 J) for heating and power to enable the EU to be free of energy imports from the RF for all carbon resources except oil. Further policy changes to facilitate a transition to sustainable resources, along with corresponding improvements in the efficiency of businesses, housing, and transport sector, could make the EU carbon neutral by 2050 and free from RF carbon imports before 2060.

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“…In addition to the extension of New START as advocated by many across the arms control community (Gottemoeller 2019a), advocates are developing a number of new ideas and proposals. These include: proposals to limit and eliminate nuclear-armed cruise missiles (Weber and Parthemore 2019); development of a new pathway toward eventual nuclear disarmament designed to maximize strategic stability as reductions occur (Gower and OBE 2019;Neuneck 2019); "developing a revised conceptual framework for arms control and strategic stability that takes into account emerging technologies and additional strategic actors (Einhorn 2019); and, limits or even outright bans on "disruptive technologies" such as hypersonic weapons (Stone 2020). Another proposal calls for adapting the "Build-down" concept -first advanced by Alton Frye in 1983, allowing for modernization programs while seeking greater reductions in older systems at the same time (Krepon 2020b).…”

Section: Development Of Alternative New Approaches To Manage and Redumentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Arms Control: Cooperative Nuclear Weapons Reductions – A New Paradigm to Roll Back Nuclear Weapons and Increase Security and Stability

Moon¹

2020

Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament

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Arms control treaties have served admirably to control and limit nuclear weapons for several decades. The provisions and limits, however, have proven to be inflexible, often limited in scope to specific systems and countries, and difficult and time-consuming to negotiate. It is time for the nuclear weapons states to consider a new paradigm to incentivize reductions while building security and stability in a more enduring and expandable format. Previous nuclear weapons security cooperative efforts between the US and Russia under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program demonstrated that countries can share data and access on nuclear warheads. Under a new cooperative forum to be established by the US and Russia and then expanded to include all five declared nuclear weapons states, a new paradigm can be envisioned that would allow for modernization as a trade-off for reductions and increases in security and stability measures. The nuclear weapons states should create an enduring forum to negotiate trade-off formulas and implement them through specific contracts to be managed as issues and technologies arise. As security and stability measures strengthen, the nuclear weapons states can increase incentives to roll back inventories on a continuous basis. ARTICLE HISTORY

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The Deep Crisis of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament: The State of Play and the Challenges

Cited by 15 publications

References 13 publications

A theory of nuclear disarmament: Cases, analogies, and the role of the non-proliferation regime

A theory of nuclear disarmament: Cases, analogies, and the role of the non-proliferation regime

Energy Security and Sustainability for the European Union after/during the Ukraine Crisis: A Perspective

Beyond Arms Control: Cooperative Nuclear Weapons Reductions – A New Paradigm to Roll Back Nuclear Weapons and Increase Security and Stability

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