The Declining Middle: Occupational Change, Social Status and the Populist Right

Abstract

This is a pre-print of an article that investigates the political consequences of occupational change in times of rapid technological advancement and sheds light on the economic and cultural roots of right-wing populism. A growing body of research shows that the disadvantages of a transforming employment structure are strongly concentrated among semiskilled routine workers in the lower middle class. I argue that individual employment trajectories and relative shifts in the social hierarchy are key to better understand recent political disruptions. A perception of relative economic decline among politically powerful groups—not their impoverishment—drives support for conservative and, especially, right-wing populist parties. Individual-level panel data from three postindustrial democracies and original survey data demonstrate this relationship. A possible interpretation of the findings is that traditional welfare policy might be an ineffective remedy against the ascent of right-wing populism.

Automation and public support for workfare

“…Entries represent new workers who join these occupations, whereas exits represent current workers leaving them. Recent studies on routine workers’ employment trajectories in Switzerland, Germany and Great Britain reveal that only a minority become unemployed; most remain employed in routine jobs (Kurer, 2020; Kurer and Gallego, 2019). They find that routine jobs disappear gradually over generations through declines in entry rates for such jobs.…”

“…Gidron and Hall (2019) posit that labour market disruptions may engender both economic and social risks. Kurer (2020) argues that routine workers face the threat of social decline even if they cling onto their routine jobs, because societal recognition and status go hand in hand with the level of demand for jobs (Ballard-Rosa et al, 2020; Jahoda, 1982). When demand for non-routine jobs outstrips demand for routine ones, the status of routine work declines vis-à-vis the status of non-routine work.…”

“…When demand for non-routine jobs outstrips demand for routine ones, the status of routine work declines vis-à-vis the status of non-routine work. Automation thus ‘reshapes the employment structure and hence the relative importance and value attached to different kinds of work’ (Kurer, 2020: 1804). As routine occupations slowly die out, the value of routine work also diminishes, leaving routine workers with the threat of social decline (Gidron and Hall, 2019: 6; Hochschild, 2016: 141; Kurer, 2020).…”

“…Yet, we argue that routine workers may support workfare. Recent studies which examine the labour market trajectories of routine workers find that most survive in their routine jobs; only a minority become unemployed (Kurer, 2020; Kurer and Gallego, 2019). These studies attribute declines in employment shares of routine occupations to a declining number of workers entering these occupations rather than an increasing number of currently employed workers exiting these occupations.…”

“…These studies attribute declines in employment shares of routine occupations to a declining number of workers entering these occupations rather than an increasing number of currently employed workers exiting these occupations. Although their ‘survival’ does not yield economic duress in the form of actual unemployment, it still creates status anxiety arising from perceptions that their relative position in the social hierarchy is declining (Kurer, 2020). When individuals worry about status decline, they may try to maintain their social distance from social groups commonly viewed to be at the bottom of the social ladder to validate their own threatened social position (Gidron and Hall, 2019; Kuziemko et al, 2014; Lamont, 2000).…”