The Decline of Gangsters and Politicization of Violence in Urban Bangladesh

Abstract

Contrary to the Weberian ideal of a central state monopolizing the means of violence, political order in many societies requires a balance of interests between diverse 'violence specialists'. In urban Bangladesh, gangsters have been identified as powerful actors, closely linked to politicians and the state. Often called mastan, they are portrayed as mediating access to work and public services, as running extortion networks and providing political muscle. Since the early 2000s Dhaka has seen radical change, largely undocumented to date: these gangsters are in significant decline. Many of the roles associated with these gangs continue, but now under the direct control of lower-level factions associated with the ruling political party -a transition that has brought a greater degree of stability to the urban context. These arguments are developed through ethnographic research from a large marketplace in the centre of Dhaka, examining the rise and fall of an infamous local gangster. In developing this case, it is argued that closer attention should be given to changes in the organization of violence within societies.

Allies among Enemies: Political authority and party (dis)loyalty in Bangladesh

“…Much recent literature from South Asia has highlighted the profound disjuncture between normative visions of democratic politics and how it unfolds in practice, demonstrating that violence, criminality and patronage are integral to the functioning of democracy on the ground (Price and Ruud 2010;Piliavsky 2014;Gerharz and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2017;Vaishnav 2017;Jackman 2018aJackman , 2018bKlem and Suykens 2018;Michelutti et al 2018). With this has come a new academic vocabulary, with terms such as 'goonda', 'mafia', 'bosses' and 'godfather' increasingly used to denote the prevalence of muscular and criminal forms of politics in the region (Piliavsky 2014;Jackman 2018a;Michelutti et al 2018;Klem and Suykens 2018). This responds in part to the political vernacular on the sub-continent, where many such terms are commonly used, as well as to a perception that the region's politics is becoming increasingly criminalized.…”

“…This is a skill honed in 'performances', through which people build reputations, and which is also sustained and embedded within wider practices of patronage and group mobilization (Klem and Suykens 2018;Michelutti 2018). On the 2 While such a shift appears real, it has also been recognized that muscle is nothing new to the region's politics, with goonda (criminal, thug, gangster) for example long identified in both urban politics and crime (Jackman 2018a). Although the popularity of particular vocabulary may be new, the style of politics may be less so.…”

“…This article tells the story behind this scene to examine a central theme within political analysis from South Asia and beyond: the character of political authority. Recent literature has illuminated the criminal and coercive character this often takes in the region (Piliavsky 2014;Vaishnav 2017;Jackman 2018aJackman , 2018bMichelutti et al 2018), where political 'bosses' resemble 'godfather', and rely on the skills of intimidation, violence and patronage for their career, built from a base of muscular cadre. At the same time, political leaders must also look up within the party hierarchy to build their career, crafting relationships with party seniors.…”

Labour power and bossing: Local leadership formation and the party-state in ‘middle’ Bangladesh

“…While much literature on Bangladesh has highlighted mastan politics (e.g., Jackman 2019; Ruud 2014), violent entrepreneurship in student politics (e.g., Andersen 2013; Kuttig 2019; Ruud 2010; Suykens 2018), and political (hartal) violence (Suykens and Islam 2013), the role of labour unions and its ‘blurred’ relations with ‘the state’, especially in the transport sector, has been absent, despite unions’ prominent role in party politics, corruption, crime, and violence.…”

Landlords’ and Compound Managers’ Role in Improving and Sustaining Shared Latrines in Three Dhaka City Slums

“…Some landlords do not invest in repairing existing latrines or installing new latrines, reasoning that their primary interests lie in maximizing the number of rooms to rent. Some landlords view the space that could be used to install latrines as potential space to set up more rooms to rent out [27]. Others express desires to improve sanitation conditions but lack the financial means to do so due to competing needs within the compound [7].…”