Abstract:What determines reciprocity in employment relations? We conducted a controlled field experiment to measure the extent to which monetary and non-monetary gifts affect workers' performance. We find that non-monetary gifts have a much stronger impact than monetary gifts of equivalent value. We also observe that when workers are offered the choice, they prefer receiving money but reciprocate as if they received a non-monetary gift. This result is consistent with the common saying, "it's the thought that counts". W… Show more
“…Our prediction that symbolic gifts (such as good personal contact) rather than wages are a manager's main means of exchange in the field is also well in line with survey evidence by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Bewley (1999) on the determinants of worker's morale, as well as with empirical work showing that firms with bad management-worker relationships are penalized in that they need to pay higher wages to attract and retain workers (e.g., Borzaga and Depedri 2005). Lastly, a recent field experiment complemented by a questionnaire study by Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2008) finds that a gift-in-kind is significantly more likely to signal kind intentions than a wage increase, and-in contrast to a wage increase-significantly increases worker's productivity.…”
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention. Contrary to the traditional gift-exchange hypothesis, we show that altruistic managers may offer lower wages and nevertheless build up better socialexchange relationships with their employees than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer -namely, a lot of attention -which will induce the employee to stay at the firm and work hard. Our predictions are well in line with some recent empirical findings about gift exchange in the field.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: D86, J41, M50, M54, M55.
“…Our prediction that symbolic gifts (such as good personal contact) rather than wages are a manager's main means of exchange in the field is also well in line with survey evidence by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Bewley (1999) on the determinants of worker's morale, as well as with empirical work showing that firms with bad management-worker relationships are penalized in that they need to pay higher wages to attract and retain workers (e.g., Borzaga and Depedri 2005). Lastly, a recent field experiment complemented by a questionnaire study by Kube, Maréchal, and Puppe (2008) finds that a gift-in-kind is significantly more likely to signal kind intentions than a wage increase, and-in contrast to a wage increase-significantly increases worker's productivity.…”
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention. Contrary to the traditional gift-exchange hypothesis, we show that altruistic managers may offer lower wages and nevertheless build up better socialexchange relationships with their employees than egoistic managers do. In such equilibria, a low wage signals to employees that the manager has something else to offer -namely, a lot of attention -which will induce the employee to stay at the firm and work hard. Our predictions are well in line with some recent empirical findings about gift exchange in the field.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor mayJEL Code: D86, J41, M50, M54, M55.
“…Indeed, recent field experiments showed that positive reciprocity does not always survive outside the laboratory (Al-Ubaydli et al, 2015; U. Gneezy & List, 2006;Kube et al, 2012;Kube, Maréchal, & Puppe, 2013). In particular, the existence of a positive wage-effort relation in actual employment relationships seems to depend on two crucial conditions which are not necessarily given in the present setting: First, only if explicit cost and surplus information are provided, allowing employees to calculate their employer's surplus from the work contract, do workers have a reference point for being reciprocal (Hennig- Schmidt et al, 2010).…”
By conducting a natural field experiment, we analyze the managerial policy of delegating the wage choice to employees. We find that this policy enhances performance significantly, which is remarkable since allocated wage premiums of the same size have no effect at all. Observed self‐imposed wage restraints and absence of negative peer effects speak in favor of wage delegation, although the chosen wage premium levels severely dampen its net value. Additional experimental and survey data provide important insights into employees' underlying motivations.
“…16 An explanation of a tournament's competitiveness index is provided at: http://www.owgr.com/about 17 Note that for the 2004 and 2006 Ryder Cup editions, the same tournament is played three times rather than two. 18 The objective of our study and the design of our empirical models are not intended to establish a comparison between monetary and nonmonetary incentives (see Kube, Marechal, & Puppe, 2012 for a comparison of the effect of monetary and nonmonetary rewards on the performance of a task). However, we see the value of providing the magnitude of monetary incentives to establish an informal comparison between the two.…”
In an environment in which elite, highly paid professionals compete for nonmonetary rewards, we find evidence of underperformance. Our analysis suggests that choking under pressure from high-stakes nonmonetary rewards is behind the underperformance. This implies that high stakes nonmonetary rewards can create meaningful pressure on individuals and lead to worse performance, a distinct issue that has yet to be adequately examined. These findings come from an examination of the behavior of top U.S. golfers competing to earn a place on the U.S. Ryder Cup team via their performance in PGA Tour tournaments with differing allocations of Ryder Cup qualifying points.
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