The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law

Complicity in International Criminal Law

“…22 Chapter four of the thesis discusses how these two models play out in the specific domestic law systems and what is the practical significance, if any, of this distinction. 18 E. Van Sliedregt, 2003 This model implies that the principal is the one most responsible in the sense of having decisive influence over the commission of the crime. In essence this normativity falls within the ambit of differential participation model as it is based on the idea of the increased blameworthiness of the perpetrator.…”

“…212 The Appeals Chamber denied the request failing to find "cogent reasons in the interests of justice" for the reconsideration of a final judgment. 213 It is disappointing that this brief decision does not explain…”

“…212 The form of liability developed in Pinkerton strongly resembles the extended form of the joint criminal enterprise as defined in Tadić. 213 The Pinkerton case has been widely criticized both in the US and abroad. 214 The rule has never been incorporated in the MPC.…”

The Fundamental Concept of Crime in International Criminal Law

“…When analysing the supporting mens rea standard of the extended category of JCE, the Brđanin Trial Chamber acknowledged the need for a clear distinction between the perception that an event is possible and the perception that an event is likely (a synonym for probable) insofar as the subjective state of mind is concerned. 611 It is highly unlikely that the tribunals, which are expected to wind up in the nearest future, will attempt to overhaul the law on mens rea. In the Chamber's opinion, "most likely" means at least probable (if not more), whereas its stated equivalence to the civil law notion of dolus eventualis would seem to reduce it once more to possibility.…”

The Crime of Conspiracy in International Criminal Law

“…Soliciting and inducement have an element of the accused prompting or encouraging the direct perpetrator to commit the crime, and these two latter forms do not necessarily need the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship. 732 Subjectively, in the case of ordering, the accused while giving the order must intend that a crime be executed pursuant to the order or be aware of the substantial likelihood that the crime will be committed. 733 In respect to soliciting and inducing, the accused should wish to "provoke or induce" the commission of the crime or be aware of the substantial likelihood that his conduct would lead to the commission of the crime.…”