The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism About Fictional Characters

Abstract

This essay explains why creationism about fictional characters is an abject failure. Creationism about fictional characters is the view that fictional objects are created by the authors of the novels in which they first appear. This essay shows that, when the details of creationism are filled in, the hypothesis becomes far more puzzling than the linguistic data it is used to explain. No matter how the creationist identifies where, when and how fictional objects are created, the proposal conflicts with other strong intuitions we have about fictional characters.

How can we reconcile the following apparent truths: ‘Sherlock Holmes doesn’t exist’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle’?

“…Parsons's view avoids some difficult questions for Creationists; viz., when and how are ficta created? After all, Brock (2010) founds his challenge to Creationism on the difficulty of these questions. What suffices to create a character?…”

Abstract Generationism: A Response to Friedell

“…David Friedell has offered a defense of abstract creationism—roughly, “the view that fictional characters, such as Sherlock Holmes and Harry Potter, are abstract objects that authors create” (, 129)—against objections raised by Stuart Brock (). Here, I grant that fictional characters are abstract objects and focus solely on issues raised by the creationism aspect of the view, as Friedell's discussion leaves us with open questions on the relation between the creation of fictional characters and authorial intentions.…”

“…Brock () takes himself to have other reasons, as well. Friedell () addresses and rejects these reasons.…”

“…I side with Friedell. I follow Brock () and Friedell () in taking the nominalist about fictional characters to be someone who makes the claim that (1) fictional characters are not abstract entities, as well as the stronger claim that (2) there are no entities that are fictional characters. An anonymous referee points out that this position is perhaps better thought of as nihilism about fictional characters .…”

Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice

“…Those who are sceptical about the explanatory value of such a proposition are, for example,Brock (2010).…”