The Costa Rican Supreme Court’s Compliance Monitoring System

Abstract

In the summer of 2009, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica began monitoring compliance with its direct orders in amparo and habeas corpus cases. The court announced the early results from its analysis at a well-attended March 2010 press conference. The president of the court promised to continue monitoring and publicizing the results for the foreseeable future. We use a unique data set on compliance derived from this monitoring system to evaluate theoretical claims about the relationship between the transparency of judicial orders and compliance. We observe that vague orders, and orders issued without definite time frames for compliance, were associated with delayed implementation. We also find that orders issued after the press conference were implemented roughly two months earlier than orders issued just prior to the press conference. A core element of the rule of law is that courts should be capable of remedying violations of legal obligations (Raz 1997, 218). To do so, relevant parties must comply with direct judicial orders. Judges themselves value compliance (e.g., Huneeus 2010; Widner 2001) in part because compliance is a key component of judicial power (Cameron 2002). Important factors that promote powerful courts rest largely beyond judicial control. Most obviously, judges are unlikely to have an immediate and strong influence on the degree to which political power is fragmented (Chávez, Ferejohn, and Weingast 2011; Ríos-Figueroa 2007) or on the drafting of formal rules that insulate themselves from external pressure (Pozas-Loyo and Ríos-Figueroa 2010). But some factors may be subject to judicial influence. Compliance, and judicial power more generally, depends on public support, which in turn is related to the transparency of the conflicts courts resolve because without at least the possibility of informing people about noncompliance, public support does not matter (Vanberg 2005; Yadav and Mukherjee 2014); and transparency is something that judges can influence. In June 2009, we began a discussion with the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica (colloquially, the "Sala Cuarta" or "Sala IV") concerning potential experimental research designs aimed at understanding better their compliance process. Instead of conducting experimental research, however, the Sala IV built its own system for monitoring compliance with all direct orders to public officials in its amparo and habeas corpus jurisdictions. In October, it began to quietly track reactions to its orders. Six months later, the Sala IV held a press conference to announce its preliminary results, which called into question the compliance record of major arms of the Costa Rican state. The press conference, advertised one week in advance, was well-attended and received careful coverage in the media. 1

Delayed but not derailed: legislative compliance with European Court of Human Rights judgments

“…The link between remedial indications and compliance with ECtHR judgments (Chapter 3) suggests that greater clarity concerning what compliance should entail promotes compliance. This finding is consistent with scholarship on other courts that has suggested that such transparency is important for holding implementing actors responsible for their compliance performance (Vanberg 2001;, Staton and Vanberg 2008, Gauri, Staton and Cullell 2015. Showing how the ECtHR has been able to use remedial indications to promote quicker compliance with some of its most challenging judgments is an important contribution to this strand of scholarship.…”

“…Comparative judicial politics scholars argue that the political and reputational costs that may compel state authorities to comply with court rulings that they would prefer to ignore, depend on the joint probability that important constituencies will detect non-compliance and view it unfavorably (Vanberg 2001, Vanberg 2005, Staton 2004, Staton 2006, Gauri, Staton and Cullell 2015. See also Rosen-berg 2008.…”

The Economic Analysis of Judicial Behavior

“…Helmke's (2002Helmke's ( , 2005 work on Argentina draws attention to the fact that in many parts of the developing world, governments have taken even more radical steps to tame their courts, with sanctions ranging from impeachment, removal, and court-packing to criminal indictment, physical violence, and even death. Her study and many others running along similar lines show that judges respond to these potential threats by defecting against the old regime (Helmke 2002(Helmke , 2005, avoiding cases that may contribute to further escalation (Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova 2002), going public (Gauri et al 2015;Staton 2010) and passing up posts on apex courts altogether (Basabe-Serrano 2012), among other strategies.…”

Directing Compliance? Remedial Approach and Compliance with European Court of Human Rights Judgments

“…Judicial power is often limited by courts' reliance on other actors to implement their rulings (Carrubba and Gabel 2015; Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla 2008; Hall 2014; Johns 2015; Kapiszewski and Taylor 2013; Rosenberg 2008; Vanberg 2001; Vanberg 2005). To promote compliance, courts therefore employ strategies designed to legitimize their judgments (Hume 2006; Larsson et al 2017; Lupu and Voeten 2012), raise public awareness (Krehbiel 2016; Staton 2006) and enable pro-compliance constituencies to monitor implementation (Gauri, Staton and Cullell 2015; Staton and Romero forthcoming). However, few scholars have evaluated whether such strategies are effective (Keck and Strother 2016, 3; but see Gauri, Staton and Cullell 2015; Staton and Romero 2019).…”