The Cost-Effectiveness of Armored Tactical Wheeled Vehicles for Overseas U.S. Army Operations

Abstract

This study uses for official use only data on US military operations to evaluate the large-scale Army policies to replace relatively light Type 1 tactical wheeled vehicles (TWVs) with more heavily protected Type 2 variants and later to replace Type 2s with more heavily protected Type 3s. We find that Type 2 TWVs reduced fatalities at $1.1 million-$24.6 million per life saved for infantry units, with our preferred cost estimates falling below the $7.5 million cost-effectiveness threshold, and did not reduce fatalities for administrative and support units. We find that replacing Type 2 with Type 3 TWVs did not appreciably reduce fatalities and was not cost-effective.

Evaluating the Tradeoffs Between Dollars Spent and Lives saved in Military Settings

“…To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of Types 1-3, Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013a) "For a given unit in month , suppose that fatalities are determined according to the following linear equation:…”

“…The differences ( ) and ( ) measure the effects of replacing Type 1 TWV with a Type 2 or Type 3 TWV." Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013a) next focus on the costs related to the vehicles by estimating changes in expenditures by unit as a function of the different vehicle types and their usage rates.…”

“…The following case study provides a summary of the methods and results presented in a recently published article by Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013a), "The Cost-Effectiveness of Armored Tactical Wheeled Vehicles for Overseas U.S. Army Operations." In their study, Rohlfs and Sullivan use a VSL cutoff of $7.5 million to determine the cost-effectiveness of three separate armored tactical wheeled vehicles.…”

“…Due to the sensitive nature of the data used in Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013a) and security restrictions put in place by the Office of Security Review (OSR), all vehicle systems in the case study to follow are labeled with the generic titles of Types 1-3, the months of data are denoted as 1 through 71, and the theater of operations is labeled Theater A.…”

“…As discussed in Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013a) Due to security restrictions by OSR, we are not permitted to disclose specific information about the attributes and history of each vehicle. We can however state that, in general, the U.S.…”