The coordination of stakeholder interests in environmental regulation: Lessons from China’s environmental regulation policies from the perspective of the evolutionary game theory

Sheng, Jichuan; Zhou, Weihai; Zhu, Bangzhu

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.119385

Cited by 103 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…(5) When the platform-leading enterprise A and the related cooperative enterprise B are in a state of cooperation, the two sides create value together, and the innovation ecosystem is developing towards a virtuous path. When one performs noncooperative behavior, it is difficult for both to create value together, and there will be many contradictions, even dissolution [40]. (6) e response of a relevant cooperative enterprise B is crucial to the choice of a platform-leading enterprise A. erefore, the strategic choice of both is a dynamic game process, and the best strategy is cooperation, which can maximize benefits, increase the overall profit of the innovation ecosystem, and minimize the total costs and risk [41].…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Coordination Mechanism of Value Cocreation of Innovation Ecosystems: Evidence from a Chinese Artificial Intelligence Enterprise

Chen

Guo

et al. 2021

Complexity

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This paper models the game process of the value cocreation of enterprises based on evolutionary game theory (EGT). The factors influencing value cocreation are found through mathematical analysis. Taking iFLYTEK as an example, a representative enterprise of artificial intelligence (AI) in China, six factors affecting value cocreation are verified, which are the excess return rate, the distribution coefficient of the excess return rate, coordination costs in the system, the cost-sharing coefficient, imitation costs, and penalties. These six factors have a profound impact on value cocreation in the ecosystem. Through the case study of iFLYTEK, it is concluded that innovation ecosystems can enable small- and medium-sized AI enterprises to grow. In order to build a sound ecosystem, we need to establish a mechanism to select partners, reduce the costs of cooperation, and strengthen the protection of intellectual property. At the beginning of the cooperation, it is necessary to establish a mechanism with clear responsibilities, rights, and interests. The conclusion is of great significance to the development of AI enterprises.

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Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Coordination Mechanism of Value Cocreation of Innovation Ecosystems: Evidence from a Chinese Artificial Intelligence Enterprise

Chen

Guo

et al. 2021

Complexity

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“…These studies show that the appropriate policies can promote green innovation [17,24]. The right policies should coordinate the interests of the central government, local governments, and enterprises according to various influencing factors [25,26].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 96%

What Hinders the Promotion of the Green Mining Mode in China? A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Local Government and Metal Mining Companies

Zhao

Zhou

et al. 2020

Sustainability

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China is currently trying to reduce the environmental impact of metal mining operations by promoting green mining. However, conflicts of interest between the central government, local governments, and metal mining companies often negatively affect the implementation of related policies. This paper conducted a theoretical analysis of the game mechanism between local governments and metal mining companies to study the factors that influence their strategies. First, we summarize the various game model parameters, determine the strategies which the companies and local government can choose, and establish the game model for the companies and the local government. Second, we list the utility of the company and local government under all game outcomes and analyse their behavioral tendencies. Third, we discuss the impacts of various factors on the choice of their mining mode in detail. The behavioral analysis shows that the local government’s inclination to supervise a mine is negatively related to the supervision cost and positively related to the production scale of this mine; various factors influence the companies in their decision making, with the yield and comprehensive utilization rate of tailings and waste rocks have the greatest impact; the scale of mine production also affects the companies’ willingness to carry out technological innovation. Finally, we offer some suggestions for the promotion of green mining.

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“…Furthermore, the coal purchase plan and power generation technology innovation in the power industry also affect coal companies' production capacity. However, the existing related researches, which mainly focus on the game between the central government, local governments, and coal enterprises [21][22][23], lack the investigation of external factors such as the market supply and demand environment [24]. In this respect, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to contemplate the intensity of carbon emission reduction and coal market demand after technological upgrading in the coal and power industries, and studies the behavioral strategy relationship and dynamic evolution mechanism among the three-party game players of the local government, power industry, and coal enterprises under different constraint scenarios so as to provide a theoretical reference for the government to regulate and control related policy systems and help coal companies to break through the dilemma of overcapacity with the goal of low-carbon development.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Research on the Impact of Environmental Regulation on Overcapacity in Coal Industry

Fan

Tingting

et al. 2021

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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Currently, the world is facing two significant challenges: low-carbon development and overcapacity. Government departments must reexamine their development strategy of energy industry. Implementing environmental regulatory policies and technological innovation can help alleviate coal industry’s overcapacity, while sustainable development requires joint actions of governments, enterprises, and the market. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of local government, power industry, and coal enterprise. Under the premise of bounded rationality, the evolution path of each player in the game under the market incentive environmental regulation is analyzed, and the influence of the change of parameters of each player on the result is numerically simulated. The study found that strengthening environmental regulation by local governments is an inevitable choice to promote the transformation and upgrading of coal industry and power industry. In addition, reducing law enforcement costs and technological innovation costs are the fundamental point of the coordinated development of the three parties. Technological innovation in the power industry will reduce the probability of coal companies’ choosing clean production strategies, while seeking low-cost clean production technology and financial support is the key to coal companies’ optimization of production capacity.

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The coordination of stakeholder interests in environmental regulation: Lessons from China’s environmental regulation policies from the perspective of the evolutionary game theory

Cited by 103 publications

References 39 publications

Research on the Coordination Mechanism of Value Cocreation of Innovation Ecosystems: Evidence from a Chinese Artificial Intelligence Enterprise

Research on the Coordination Mechanism of Value Cocreation of Innovation Ecosystems: Evidence from a Chinese Artificial Intelligence Enterprise

What Hinders the Promotion of the Green Mining Mode in China? A Game-Theoretical Analysis of Local Government and Metal Mining Companies

Evolutionary Game Research on the Impact of Environmental Regulation on Overcapacity in Coal Industry

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