The Contribution of Security to Well-being

Abstract

Do unknown and unrealized risks of harm diminish an individual’s well-being? The traditional answer is no: that the security of prudential goods benefits an individual only instrumentally or by virtue of their subjective sense of security. Recent work has argued, however, that the security of prudential goods non-instrumentally benefits an individual regardless of whether or not they enjoy subjective security. In this paper, I critically examine three claims about the way in which unknown and unrealized risks of harm might diminish individual well-being: (i) it frustrates a desire to be secure, (ii) it frustrates the enjoyment of modally-robust goods, and (iii) it undermines the ability to make reasonable plans. Ultimately, I argue that all three of these hypotheses are mistaken, but that they deepen our understanding of the ways in which subjective security is an important constituent of individual well-being.

Humanizing Security through Action‐oriented Research in Latin America

“…For example, is security only about the protection of people against actual physical violence? Or is it about the absence of risks to the enjoyment of happiness, physical health and a secure income (Herington, 2015, 2019), which also constructs subjective feelings of security and well‐being?…”

“…The concept of ‘human security’, much updated since its original formulation in 1994 (see United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, 2018), enabled us with our research partners to explore the objective ‘facts’ of security/insecurity as experienced by citizens together with their subjective ‘feelings’ and ‘beliefs’, and how both impact on their capacity to act consciously, as human beings and as citizens in specific environments. Herington's (2019) philosophical exploration highlights the importance of what he calls ‘belief‐relative security’, as necessary to rational life planning, in turn widely accepted as prudentially valuable. This goes beyond the adverse consequences of believing oneself at risk, which then engenders feelings of fear and anxiety.…”

Being Sure and Living Well: How Security Affects Human Flourishing

“…John ( 2011 ) has developed a stimulating argument for considering physical security a constituent of well-being. But the most important source to be acknowledged here is the work of Herington ( 2015 , 2017 , 2019 ). Particularly valuable is his analysis of the contribution that security makes to well-being, which he investigates from the perspectives of hedonic, desire-satisfaction, and objective-list theories of well-being (2019).…”

On the Harm of Imposing Risk of Harm

“…4 For the purposes of this paper, I only focus on the preference and autonomy account. Other closely-related accounts that argue for the Constitutive Claim include Adriana Placani's (2016) dignity account, Jonathan Herington's (2019) and Seth Lazar's (2019) security account, and Maria Ferretti's (2016) freedom account. Wherever necessary, I've indicated where my discussion applies to these alternative accounts too.…”

“…For instance, JohnOberdiek (2012) objects that the harm identified by preference frustration is of the wrong kind. JonathanHerington (2019) objects that Finkelstein's account faces a dilemma between embracing an implausible actual-desire theory or embracing an ideal theory that fails to account for risk.11 Herington (2019) thinks this is plausible on a general description of the preference theory.12 Hayenhjelm and Wolff (2011) raise a similar problem of paralysis for rights-based theories. The idea there is that it is impossible to assign individuals the right not to be subjected to risk without their consent, insofar virtually every action carries with it some risk, however small, of serious harm to others.13 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.…”