2006
DOI: 10.1080/13803390590949511
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The Contribution of a Cognitive Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) to Delusions in Schizophrenia

Abstract: A neuropsychological paradigm is introduced that provides a measure of a bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and its correspondence with delusions in people with schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder was investigated. Fifty-two patients diagnosed with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder (36 were acutely delusional) and 24 healthy control participants were presented with delusion-neutral pictures in each trial, and were asked to rate the plausibility of four written interpretations of the s… Show more

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Cited by 196 publications
(163 citation statements)
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“…Together with the change of conclusion, the strong correlation we found between this measure and the PDI-21 scores is reminiscent of the results of Woodward et al (2006b). These authors showed that schizophrenia patients exhibited a hindsight bias, that is, a tendency to disregard past errors and act as though they "knew it all along" (the 'KIA effect').…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 72%
“…Together with the change of conclusion, the strong correlation we found between this measure and the PDI-21 scores is reminiscent of the results of Woodward et al (2006b). These authors showed that schizophrenia patients exhibited a hindsight bias, that is, a tendency to disregard past errors and act as though they "knew it all along" (the 'KIA effect').…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 72%
“…32,33 The apparent irreconcilability of the 2 concepts (i.e., that delusions are associated with a bias toward disconfirmatory evidence in the JTC literature and a bias against disconfirmatory evidence in the BADE literature) could be resolved by accepting that what is described by other groups as a disconfirmatory bias in JTC should perhaps be reconceptualized as a hypersalience of evidence-hypothesis matches, because the hypersalience reported here does not extend to an enhanced tendency to disconfirm previously supported outcomes.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, the most often cited effect originates from the observation that schizophrenia patients with persecutory delusions are inclined to 'jump to conclusions' and make impulsive and premature decisions exclusive of sufficient information on probabilistic reasoning tasks (Dudley et al, 2015;Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, & Rief, 2010;Garety et al, 1991;Garety et al, 2005;So, Garety, Peters, & Kapur, 2010). Delusional patients also tend to rigidly hold their beliefs and refuse to consider any disconfirmatory evidence (Woodward, Moritz, Cuttler, & Whitman, 2006). In addition, these patients have trouble envisioning others' intentions or drawing plausible conclusions about the motives of others (Corcoran et al, 1995;Frith & Corcoran, 1996;Brune, 2005;Harrington, Langdon, Siegert, & McClure, 2005;, an ability widely known as Theory of Mind which has been defined as the "capacity to represent one's own and other persons' mental states" (Brune, 2005, p 21).…”
Section: Study Aimmentioning
confidence: 99%