The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout

Abstract

A substantial body of research examines whether increasing the proportionality of an electoral system increases turnout, mostly based on cross-national comparisons. In this study, we offer two main contributions to the previous literature. First, we show that moving from a single-member district system to proportional representation in multi-member districts should, according to recent theories of elite mobilization, produce a contraction in the distribution of mobilizational effort across districts, and hence a contraction in the distribution of turnout rates. Second, we exploit a within-country panel dataset based on stable subnational geographic units before and after Norway's historic 1921 electoral reform in order to test various implications stemming from the contraction hypothesis. We find significant support for the predictions of the elite mobilization models. (122 words) Word count: 8,793 words (excluding title page and online appendix)

Measuring the Competitiveness of Elections

“…To illustrate this point, we use historical data from Norwegian parliamentary (Storting) elections (1909)(1910)(1911)(1912)(1913)(1914)(1915)(1916)(1917)(1918)(1919)(1920)(1921)(1922)(1923)(1924)(1925)(1926)(1927) and more recent data from Swiss National Council elections . As noted, the Norwegian historical data have the advantage of holding country-specific factors constant, while spanning an electoral reform from runoff elections in SMDs to PR elections in MMDs (Cox, Fiva and Smith, 2016). 17 The Swiss data have the useful feature that district magnitude varies across districts in each election-from single-seat districts to large multimember districts (Grofman and Selb, 2009).…”

“…The right-hand panels relate Grofman-Selb's (2009) index of competition to district magnitude. In the top panel, we use the balanced panel data set of Cox, Fiva and Smith (2016) covering Norway, 1909-1927. Two-round elections were used from 1909-1918, proportional representation from 1921-1927 In the pre-reform period we construct the distance measures using the electoral results from the first round.…”

“…Voter turnout is measured in the final round, as in Cox, Fiva and Smith (2016). In the bottom panel, we use data from Switzerland, 1971-2003(Grofman and Selb, 2011.…”

“…(3) (4) , 1909-1927 Note: Simple linear regression of (final round) voter turnout against three alternative measures of competition. We use the balanced panel data set of Cox et al (2016) covering Norway, 1909-1927 In columns (1), (2), and (3), we use data from 1909-1918 (two-round elections). In columns (4), (5), and (6), we use data from 1921-1927 (proportional representation).…”

“…In the pre-reform period we construct the distance measures using the electoral results from the first round. Voter turnout is measured in the final round, as in Cox et al (2016).…”