The Constitutional Court of Czechia

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the Czech Constitutional Court (CCC). It shows, on the one hand, how the CCC has so far skilfully navigated through political ups and downs and has risen to prominence in Czech politics. On the other hand, this chapter also suggests that the CCC, despite its current wide powers, is a rather fragile institution. It argues that the creation of the CCC must be understood in the broader historical and political context. To that end, the chapter sketches the institutional design of the CCC and discusses the CCC’s powers. Subsequently, the chapter analyses the internal judicial practices of the CCC and the key procedural rules, then provides the taxonomy of the CCC’s rulings as well as their style, effects, and publication. Finally, it identifies and discusses political determinants of the CCC’s functioning and focuses on the interaction of the CCC with other domestic as well as supranational actors.

Constitutional Referrals by Ordinary Courts: A Platform for Judicial Dialogue and Another Toolkit for Judicial Resistance?

“…As hinted, it was not the first time the Czech Constitutional Court had dealt with cuts in judges' pay. 158 The Constitutional Court has consistently reiterated that the independence of the judiciary ranks among fundamental principles of the Czech legal order, and the reduction in judicial salaries is per se a violation of such independence, as it could be abused as a form of governmental or legislative pressure upon the judicial branch. 159 Unsurprisingly, judges are aware of this case law and know that the Constitutional Court has so far always sided with them.…”

“…Failure to do so risks undermining public trust in the judiciary and fostering resentment in society, creating the sense that judges are an untouchable elite group, which thus becomes a breeding ground for politicians aiming to capture the judiciary. 166 Furthermore, when constitutional courts are captured by political forces, as has been the case in countries like Hungary and Poland, 167 the constitutional referrals process becomes futile for the purposes outlined above, leaving recourse to supranational courts as the only viable alternative. 168 In contrast, in such an environment constitutional referrals can be abused as another tool of the ruling political majority.…”

“…The institutional frameworks of states with constitutional referrals mechanisms are very often similar, which makes it possible to examine the impact of legal or constitutional culture, the political reality, as well as historical implications for different uses of constitutional referrals in practice. Since Czechia represents a relatively still fragile democracy in the state of 'democratic careening', 176 this article contributes to the topical discussion on democratic decay. It introduces a new tool of judicial resistance vis-à-vis political interference aimed at undermining not only judicial independence but also the rule of law as such.…”