Representation in the national legislature, whether proportionate to people or equal for all states, was the signature issue of the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The resulting Great Compromise was the signature achievement. This article argues that the nationalists' loss on proportional representation cannot be explained simply as a pragmatic accommodation in the face of obdurate opposition by small-state delegations. Such obduracy existed, and it mattered. But it was met by obduracy in kind and in defense of a position that was inherently stronger. Why then did the nationalist coalition fail? It failed, the article contends, because, in addition to the opposition it encountered and the tactical mistakes it made, the three-part argument it mounted logically required that the states be abolished and the regime founded be a democracy. The large-state nationalists yielded in the end because they were not consolidationists and not democrats. One great anomaly of the American political system is that the principle of one person, one vote applies only to half of the legislative branch. In the Senate each state is equally represented no matter its size. Thus Wyoming, with a population under 600,000, has the same senatorial representation as California, with a population over 38,000,000. Sixty-five times more populous is California than Wyoming, and yet they both send two senators to Washington. The story of the Constitutional Convention and of the Great Compromise that made representation in the lower house proportional and in the upper house equal has been told many times before. What is intended here is not a retelling