The Constitution Relation and Baker’s Account of It

Abstract

A traditional argument based on Leibniz's Law concludes that, for example, a statue and the piece of marble of which it is made are two different objects. This is because they have different properties: the statue can survive the loss of some of its parts but the piece of marble cannot. Lynne Rudder Baker adds that the piece of marble constitutes the statue. In this paper I focus on what I think is the most powerful objection to Baker's account of the constitution relation, which has to do with her notion of circumstances. I present the objection following Derk Pereboom's formulation and, afterwards, I analyse Baker's answers to the criticism. I conclude that they make her overall project less attractive. Finally, I propose a new answer to the criticism. This will suppose a new formulation of the constitution relation, albeit done in the spirit of Baker's account.

Qua-Objects, (Non-)Derivative Properties and the Consistency of Hylomorphism

“…8 For some different accounts of the constitution relation, see, for example, Fine (1982), Baker (2000Baker ( , 2007, Koslicki (2004Koslicki ( , 2008, Campdelacreu (2015) and Saenz (2015).…”