The consequentialist problem with prepunishment

Abstract

This paper targets a nearly universal assumption in the philosophical literature: that prepunishment is unproblematic for consequentialists. Prepunishment threats do not deter, as deterrence is traditionally conceived. In fact, a pure prepunishment legal system would tend to increase the criminal disposition of the grudgingly compliant. This is a serious problem since, from many perspectives, but especially from a consequentialist one, a primary purpose of punishment is deterrence. I analyze the decision theory behind preand postpunishments, which helps clarify both what deterrence is and how it operates in consequentialist justifications of punishment. I end by sketching a road map for the future of prepunishment as artificial intelligence and other technological advances generate increasing possibilities for its use.

What's Wrong with Prepunishment?

“…2 See Greene (2021), who also cites Smilansky (2007, p. 347), Beebee (2008, p. 259) and Wringe (2012, p. 135) as among those who have described as 'prepunishment' something which prevents a crime that would otherwise have occurred. This is also, of course, what the criminal justice agency Precrime aims to do in Philip K. Dick's The Minority Report, although the term 'prepunishment' notably does not appear in the book.…”