2008
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1330384
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The Consequences of an Open Labour Market in a Closed Product Market in the Economic Environment of European Professional Football

Abstract: Ever since the Bosman case opened the labour market for players in European professional football, competitive balance has reduced in favour of the Big 5 leagues (England, Spain, Italy, Germany and France). In this article we show that changing structures towards an open labour market in a closed product market resulted in a migration of player talents towards the major leagues and teams and in a competitive disadvantage for the smaller market leagues and their teams. Next to a theoretical argumentation, we pr… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Second, together with the change toward multiple direct qualification of clubs from higher ranked leagues, UEFA also adapted the distribution system of CL revenues in 1999. From the introduction of the CL in 1992, UEFA divided 75% of their television and sponsorship revenues according to CL performance (see, e.g., Dejonghe & Van Opstal, 2009). From 1999 onward, half of this share is distributed as a fixed sum, depending on CL participation and performance, and the other half as a variable sum, depending on the relative value of the broadcasting market in each country (and each club's CL performance relative to the performance of the other clubs from the same country).…”
Section: Discussion and Alternative Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, together with the change toward multiple direct qualification of clubs from higher ranked leagues, UEFA also adapted the distribution system of CL revenues in 1999. From the introduction of the CL in 1992, UEFA divided 75% of their television and sponsorship revenues according to CL performance (see, e.g., Dejonghe & Van Opstal, 2009). From 1999 onward, half of this share is distributed as a fixed sum, depending on CL participation and performance, and the other half as a variable sum, depending on the relative value of the broadcasting market in each country (and each club's CL performance relative to the performance of the other clubs from the same country).…”
Section: Discussion and Alternative Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Başka bir çarpıcı örnek de UEFA kurallarına göre futbolcu lisanslarının futbol kulüpleri dışındaki 3. kişilerce alınıp satılmasının yasak olmasıdır (20,21,22 Futbol sektöründe yukarıda sayılan örneklere temel olan ve futbolun miladı olarak anılan gelişme Bosman kurallarıdır. Belçikalı oyuncu Jean Marc Bosman tarafından 1995 yılında Avrupa Adalet Divanı'nda açılan dava sonucu, (Avrupa Birliği işçilerin serbest dolaşımı ilkesine aykırı olduğundan ötürü) UEFA müsabakalarında yer alacak yabancı oyuncu sayısı sınırı 3 iken sınırsız hale gelmiş, Avrupa'ya Avrupa Ekonomik Alanı içinden transfer olan oyuncuların yabancı statüsü kalkmış, futbolcu transferlerindeki eski takıma ücret ödeme zorunluluğu kaldırılmıştır (20).…”
Section: Uluslararasi Ve Ulusal Boyutta Sektörel Anali̇zunclassified
“…Başka bir çarpıcı örnek de UEFA kurallarına göre futbolcu lisanslarının futbol kulüpleri dışındaki 3. kişilerce alınıp satılmasının yasak olmasıdır (20,21,22). 2000'li yılların başında İngiltere'nin Westham United kulübü Arjantinli genç yıldız oyuncular Carlos Tevez ve Havier Mascherano'nun lisanslarını bir yatırım şirketinden satın almış ve oyuncuları İngilere'ye getirmiştir.…”
Section: Uluslararasi Ve Ulusal Boyutta Sektörel Anali̇zunclassified