The Confinement Problem in the Presence of Faults

Harrison, William L.; Procter, Adam; Allwein, Gerard

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-34281-3_15

Cited by 9 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Staging annotations enable programmers to safely encode source-level transformations and optimizations. Previous work has focused on type systems for enforcing fault isolation in calculi based on reactive resumptions [17]; we believe that a similar strategy may be employed to enforce information flow security.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But ReWire is based in modular monadic semantics [21] applied to concurrency [16], and so it exhibits a fourth "P": provability. Previous work [15,17] demonstrates the utility of monadic types and structures to verifying security and safety properties. Edwards [5] has commented on the difficulty of compiling from a C like language to hardware.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The point of departure for this work is the application of ideas from monadic semantics (esp., monads of resumptions and state and effect types) to the modeling and verification of concurrent systems [15][16][17]. As design tools, these ideas have many virtues.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…ReWire is a formally defined programming language for expressing reactive, concurrent, and parallel computations. ReWire is a computational λ -calculus [22] and, as such, is conducive to formal verification [14] of, in particular, security and safety properties [15,17]. ReWire is a subset of Haskell, where the subset has been carefully chosen so that every ReWire program may be compiled to working hardware implementations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Semantics Driven Hardware Design, Implementation, and Verification with ReWire

Procter

Harrison

Graves

et al. 2015

Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGBED Conference on Languages, Compilers and Tools for Embedded Systems 2015 CD-ROM

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There is no such thing as high assurance without high assurance hardware. High assurance hardware is essential, because any and all high assurance systems ultimately depend on hardware that conforms to, and does not undermine, critical system properties and invariants. And yet, high assurance hardware development is stymied by the conceptual gap between formal methods and hardware description languages used by engineers. This paper presents ReWire, a functional programming language providing a suitable foundation for formal verification of hardware designs, and a compiler for that language that translates high-level, semantics-driven designs directly into working hardware. ReWire's design and implementation are presented, along with a case study in the design of a secure multicore processor, demonstrating both ReWire's expressiveness as a programming language and its power as a framework for formal, high-level reasoning about hardware systems.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Semantics Driven Hardware Design, Implementation, and Verification with ReWire

Procter

Harrison

Graves

et al. 2015

Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGBED Conference on Languages, Compilers and Tools for Embedded Systems 2015 CD-ROM

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“…The point of departure for this work is the application of ideas from monadic semantics (especially monads of resumptions and state and effect types) to the modeling and verification of concurrent systems [Harrison and Hook 2009;Harrison et al 2012;Harrison and Procter 2015]. As design tools, these ideas have many virtues.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Principled Approach to Secure Multi-core Processor Design with ReWire

Procter

Harrison

Graves

et al. 2017

ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst.

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There is no such thing as high assurance without high assurance hardware. High assurance hardware is essential because any and all high assurance systems ultimately depend on hardware that conforms to, and does not undermine, critical system properties and invariants. And yet, high assurance hardware development is stymied by the conceptual gap between formal methods and hardware description languages used by engineers. This article advocates a semantics-directed approach to bridge this conceptual gap. We present a case study in the design of secure processors, which are formally derived via principled techniques grounded in functional programming and equational reasoning. The case study comprises the development of secure single-and dual-core variants of a single processor, both based on a common semantic specification of the ISA. We demonstrate via formal equational reasoning that the dual-core processor respects a "nowrite-down" information flow policy. The semantics-directed approach enables a modular and extensible style of system design and verification. The secure processors require only a very small amount of additional code to specify and implement, and their security verification arguments are concise and readable. Our approach rests critically on ReWire, a functional programming language providing a suitable foundation for formal verification of hardware designs. This case study demonstrates both ReWire's expressiveness as a programming language and its power as a framework for formal, high-level reasoning about hardware systems.CCS Concepts: r Security and privacy → Logic and verification; Security in hardware; r Hardware → Hardware description languages and compilation; Functional verification; r Software and its engineering → Functional languages;Additional Key Words and Phrases: Equational reasoning, monads, hardware security, reconfigurable computing ACM Reference Format: Adam Procter, William L. Harrison, Ian Graves, Michela Becchi, and Gerard Allwein. 2017. A principled approach to secure multicore processor design with ReWire.

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