The concept horse with no name

Trueman, Robert

doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0377-x

Cited by 20 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…As many of the papers in this volume demonstrate, Fregean realism has enjoyed a recent surge of popularity (though not always by that name). Fregean realists include Prior (1971), Geach (1976), Rayo and Yablo (2001), Williamson (2003Williamson ( , 2013, Noonan (2006), Krämer (2014), Trueman (2015Trueman ( , 2021, Dorr (2016), Jones (2016Jones ( , 2018, and Goodman (2017). (Prior would have resented being called a 'realist', but see Trueman (2021: chs 7 & 9) for discussion of just how minimal that label is in a higher-order setting.…”

Section: 𝛼(𝛼T) 𝛼mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Fictionalist Theory of Universals

Tim,

Robert

2024

Higher-Order Metaphysics

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Universals are putative objects like wisdom, morality, redness, etc. Although we believe in properties (which, we argue, are not a kind of object), we do not believe in universals. However, a number of ordinary, natural language constructions seem to commit us to their existence. In this paper, we provide a fictionalist theory of universals, which allows us to speak as if universals existed, whilst denying that any really do.

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Section: 𝛼(𝛼T) 𝛼mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Fictionalist Theory of Universals

Tim,

Robert

2024

Higher-Order Metaphysics

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“…30 For the record, I do think predicates refer, but I do not think that they refer in the same sense as singular terms; in fact, I think that what it is for a predicate to refer is for it to say something of an object. See Trueman (2015) and Sect. 7-9 of this paper.…”

Section: Sense-substitution and Predicatesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Substitution in a sense

Trueman

2017

Philos Stud

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The Reference Principle (RP) states that co-referring expressions are everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. On first glance, (RP) looks like a truism, but a truism with some bite: (RP) transforms difficult philosophical questions about co-reference into easy grammatical questions about substitutability. This has led a number of philosophers to think that we can use (RP) to make short work of certain longstanding metaphysical debates. For example, it has been suggested that all we need to do to show that the predicate '( ) is a horse' does not refer to a property is point out that '( ) is a horse' and 'the property of being a horse' are not everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. However, when we understand 'substitution' in the simplest and most straightforward way, (RP) is no truism; in fact, natural languages are full of counterexamples to the principle. In this paper, I introduce a new notion of substitution, and then develop and argue for a version of (RP) that is immune to these counterexamples. Along the way I touch on the following topics: the relation between argument forms and their natural language instances; the reification of sense; the difference between terms and predicates; and the relation between reference and disquotation. I end by arguing that my new version of (RP) cannot be used to settle metaphysical debates quite as easily as some philosophers would like.

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“…1 Notable recent contributions to the topic include Hale (2010), Hale and Wright (2012), Hale (2013, Hale and Linnebo (TS), Jolley (2007), MacBride (2011), Noonan (2006), Proops (2013), Rayo (TS), Textor (2010) and Trueman (2015). 2 A powerful case against the Reference Principle is presented in Oliver (2005).…”

Section: Frege Against Singular Reference To Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 One of the highlights of this latest tranche of research on the paradox is Robert Trueman's 'The concept horse with no name' (Trueman 2015). Trueman presents an impressive and innovative defense of Frege's rejection of singular reference to concepts-a defense that, importantly, forgoes appeal to Wright's ill-fated Reference Principle, which has played such a central role in discussions of the justification of Frege's position on the topic.…”

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confidence: 99%

Naming the concept horse

Price

2016

Philos Stud

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Frege's rejection of singular reference to concepts is centrally implicated in his notorious paradox of the concept horse. I distinguish a number of claims in which that rejection might consist and detail the dialectical difficulties confronting the defense of several such claims. Arguably the least problematic such claim-that it is simply nonsense to say that a concept can be referred to with a singular term-has recently received a novel defense due to Robert Trueman. I set out Trueman's argument for this claim, identifying and remedying some omissions and errors of formulation therein. I then develop a response to the argument by showing, pace Trueman, that it is possible-and how it is possible-to express identities between objects and concepts.

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The concept horse with no name

Cited by 20 publications

References 14 publications

A Fictionalist Theory of Universals

A Fictionalist Theory of Universals

Substitution in a sense

Naming the concept horse

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