The Complexity of Fair Division of Indivisible Items with Externalities
Argyrios Deligkas,
Eduard Eiben,
Viktoriia Korchemna
et al.
Abstract:We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items allocated to other agents.
We focus on the extended definitions of envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX), and we provide the landscape of their complexity for several different scenarios. We prove that it is NP-complete to decide whethe… Show more
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