The Committee System: Powers, Appointments and Report Allocation*

Abstract

The European Parliament (EP), like the US Congress, is often depicted as a parliament with strong committees and weak parties. This article compares the powers of the EP's committees with their counterparts in national legislatures and examines the role of party groups in the committees. Analysing the principles guiding the appointments to committees, the selection of committee chairs, and the distribution of reports within the committees, we show that national party delegations inside the transnational groups are often key gatekeepers in the division of spoils within the groups, with group leaders restricted in their ability to direct the actions of their committee members. The distribution of reports between party groups and national delegations produces interesting variation, with the two largest groups (PES and EPP) largely in control of key reports, while the size of national parties inside the main groups is the primary factor in explaining the output of national delegations. * We are grateful to Nick Clegg, Francis Jacobs, Michael Shackleton, Richard Whitaker and the editors of this special issue for their helpful comments. VIRGINIE MAMADOUH AND TAPIO RAUNIO

Tenure, turnover and careers in the European Parliament: MEPs as policy-seekers

“…We hypothesize that policy-seeking legislators should be more likely to want to remain in the EP as its legislative power grows. This may be particularly the case for MEPs in the larger groups, which have a greater chance of affecting the outcomes of votes in the EP and which gain larger numbers of rapporteurships than smaller EP groups (Mamadouh and Raunio 2003). A further implication of this theory is that policy-seeking MEPs should be more attracted to remaining on European Parliament committees the greater their degree of legislative activity.…”

Participation and Political Competition in Committee Report Allocation

“…Policy expertise, attitudes towards European integration and the governing status of the national party affect an MEP's chances of obtaining a report. By accumulating policy expertise, building consensus among party groups and negotiating with the Council and the Commission, individual rapporteurs can acquire considerable leverage over policy outcomes at the European level (Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003).…”

Policy Preference Formation in Legislative Politics: Structures, Actors, and Focal Points

“…In effect, most of the detailed parliamentary work is conducted in and by committees, the majority of substantive changes and compromises are constructed inside the committee, and committee work is the most time-consuming activity for parliamentarians and defines the focus of their work (Kreppel 2005;Corbett et al 2005;Neuhold 2001). As the powers of the EP have increased over time, so has the role of its committees in shaping legislation, especially as they have progressively acquired policy-specific expertise (Mamadouh and Raunio 2003). As a result, EP committees are more active and influential than their counterparts in national European parliaments.…”

“…16 For a comparison between EP committees and those in other European national legislatures, see Mamadouh and Raunio (2003). For a comparison between the EP and the U.S. Congress, see Kreppel (2005).…”

“…Moreover, the evidence points toward a high degree of specialization among committee members who tend to self-select into the committees of their choice based on policy interest (McElroy 2003;Whitaker 2001), rather than constituency concerns (Whitaker 2001;Mamadouh and Raunio 2003). Therefore, empirical evidence suggests that EP committees assume an informational role by supplying information that reduces individual legislators' uncertainty about the consequences of diverse legislative proposals (Krehbiel 1991).…”