The Cognitive/Noncognitive Debate in Emotion Theory: A Corrective From Spinoza

Abstract

An intractable problem that characterizes the contemporary philosophical discussion of emotion is whether emotions are fundamentally cognitive or noncognitive. In this article, I will establish that this problem arises from the influence of an underlying philosophical anthropology that entails a mind/body “split” ultimately inherited from Cartesianism, and further show that it can be fruitfully addressed by adopting a contemporary construal of the self and emotions derived from the philosophy of a key critic of Descartes’ dualism, Spinoza.

On the Emotion–Cognition Dialectic: A Sociocultural Response to Prior

“…We applaud him for taking on such a timely, yet complex and controversial topic. Interest in emotion theory and research, as documented by Prior, is not only prevalent and spreading in our field, it has also attracted a considerable degree of attention in general psychology (see England, ) as well as in sociocultural psychology (see Fleer, González Rey, & Veresov, ; Poehner & Swain, ; Ratner, , ; Swain, ).…”

“…He notes that among Western researchers Cartesian dualism has generated a seemingly unending debate on the topic, while scholars from Indigenous traditions have adopted an integrative perspective that incorporates emotion, mind, body, and spirit. The specifics and consequences of the Cartesian debate are elegantly examined by England (), who argues that the only way out of the Western conundrum is to propose a completely new ontological stance, which she does when she explores the implications of the writings of Vygotsky's favorite philosopher, Baruch Spinoza, who proposed a viable approach to overcoming Descartes's mind–body separation—an approach that Vygotsky introduced into psychology at the start of 20th century. In our commentary, we would like to briefly flesh out this alternative approach to the emotion–cognition problem.…”