The cognitive–affective crossfire: When self-consistency confronts self-enhancement.

Abstract

Self-consistency theory assumes that people want others to treat them in a predictable manner. Selfenhancement theory contends that people want others to treat them in a positive manner. We attempted to help reconcile the two theories by testing the hypothesis that people's cognitive responses conform to self-consistency theory and their affeetive responses conform to self-enhancement theory. We presented individuals who possessed either positive or negative self-concepts with either favorable or unfavorable social feedback. We then measured cognitive reactions to the feedback (e.g., perceived self-descriptiveness) and alfective reactions to the feedback (e.g., mood states). Cognitive responses were primarily driven by the consistency of the feedback and affeetive responses were controlled by how enhancing it was. We propose that conceptualizing cognition and affect as partially independent mental systems helps resolve some long-standing paradoxes regarding people's responses to selfrelevant social feedback.When we undertake to cure a patient, to free him from the symptoms of his malady, he confronts us with a vigorous, tenacious resistance that lasts during the whole time of the treatment. This is so peculiar a fact that we cannot expect much credence for it .... Just consider, this patient suffers from his symptoms and causes those about him to suffer with him.., and yet he struggles, in the very interests of the malady, against one who would help him. How improbable this assertion must sound! (Freud, 1921, p. 248) Improbable perhaps, yet Freud's assertion has fared well over the years. Self-consistency theorists, for example, contend that much like Freud's patients, people with negative self-concepts undermine opportunities to better themselves by engaging in cognitive and behavioral activities that perpetuate their selfviews. Yet, as Freud feared, such contentions have raised a fair number of eyebrows. Self-enhancement theorists, for example, have rejected self-consistency theory by arguing that in fact people with negative self-concepts are highly motivated to improve their self-views. This raises an important question: Does selfconsistency or self-enhancement theory offer a more compelling characterization ofhuman nature?

Identity affirmation and social movement support

“…At first glance, it may seem odd that we did not observe a similar interaction for the manipulation check measure tapping participants' feelings of pleasantness and satisfaction. However, this observation is in full agreement with other work on self-perception that suggests that affective reactions to feedback about (non-)possession of desired characteristics are not moderated by self-definition, whereas perceptual or cognitive reactions are (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987).…”

Self-esteem and direct versus indirect forms of self-enhancement.

“…On the basis of a drive-reduction model, these theorists have proposed that people with low self-esteem seek self-aggrandizement more avidly than do those with high self-esteem, and that self-enhancement biases are therefore more prevalent among those with low self-esteem than those with high self-esteem. Self-consistency theorists, however, have emphasized the degree to which individuals actively strive to preserve their current self-conceptions (Lecky, 1945;Swann, 1987). According to this model, people with high self-estcem seek to confirm their positive self-views and those with low selfesteem, their negative self-views.…”

Is identityper seirrelevant? A contrarian view of self-verification effects

“…In addition, both [17] and [18] found that, whereas cheerful people regarded flattering feedback as more accurate than critical feedback, depressed people regarded critical feedback as more accurate than positive feedback. They also found that, whereas feedback desirability did not predict feedback or interaction partner choice, perceived feedback accuracy did (see also [37] ). Finally, in normal samples, [39] found that perceived feedback accuracy fully mediated feedback choice, while[ [9] : Experiment 3] found that feedback consistent with self-views was regarded as especially informative.…”

“…[36][37][38] For example [16] found that, in a sample of cheerful and depressed people, ratings of feedback credibility and self-descriptiveness intercorrelated highly, and when amalgamated into a single index, predicted interest in interacting with evaluators (Experiment 1). In addition, both [17] and [18] found that, whereas cheerful people regarded flattering feedback as more accurate than critical feedback, depressed people regarded critical feedback as more accurate than positive feedback.…”