The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development From Monarchy to Democracy*

Huang, Fali

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00723.x

Cited by 15 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 65 publications

(70 reference statements)

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“… 9 Following Acemoglu and Robinson, Huang (2007) emphasizes the distributive conflict among different factor owners in a political‐economy framework to analyze the democratization process. She concludes that the fundamental force underlying democratization is not the income level per se, but the changing factor composition. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Resource Curse, Political Entry, and Deadweight Costs

Tsui

2010

Economics & Politics

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A simple model of political entry in a two-sector economy is developed to analyze the effects of natural resource wealth on economic policy, political development, and civil insurrection. The model emphasizes the role of political entry and deadweight costs of taxation on the joint determination of these economic and political outcomes. Contrary to popular belief, my model shows that natural resource abundance is an economic blessing even in a rent-seeking society, although resource dependence can be negatively associated with economic performance. In a contested political market, dictators care about popular support and hence resource wealth can help reduce the deadweight cost of taxation (and hence the cost of public good provision). On the other hand, natural resource wealth can be a political curse, because it encourages political entry and hence it induces incumbent dictators to run more repressive regimes. With constant returns counterinsurgent technology, however, the equilibrium number of insurgents is independent of the size of resource wealth. The onset of civil war, therefore, depends on the counterinsurgent technology and whether the costs of entry deterrence are affected by resource wealth. This helps clarify the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses that "resource wealth enhances regime durability" and "resource wealth fuels conflict." Copyright 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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confidence: 99%

Resource Curse, Political Entry, and Deadweight Costs

Tsui

2010

Economics & Politics

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“…Politically constrained institutional setups have also been studied extensively over time. As examples, Huang [2012] aims to model the transitions from one political system to another as solutions to changes in the relative importance of factors of production while Sekeris [2011] decomposes the (parasitic) elite and highlights the effects on development depending on its endogenous composition.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Intrafamily bargaining and love

2014

Rev Econ Household

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“…Politics and economy are keenly intertwined (Huang, 2012). Electioneering process often gulps a lot of spending, affects government policies and corporate governance since the incumbent government would try every means to be re-elected, or make its candidate to emerge as winner.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Persistence of Stock Market Returns During the Presidential Elections in Nigeria

Yaya

Adekoya

Adesiyan³

2020

SSRN Journal

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Following empirical evidences that political activities impact stock market performance, this present paper examines efficiency and volatility of Nigerian stock market during presidential elections. We use a 5-month event window approach to obtain the data for each election period. This implies that for each election period, we obtain the daily stock price index for the election month (4 weeks) and two months (8 weeks) before and after it. Our fractional integration technique reveals that the stock price index was persistent during most of the election years, with the exemptions of 2011 and 2019 election year, while 2015 election period recorded the highest volatility. However, accounting for structural breaks following the approach of Enders and Lee (2012a,b) that inculcates nonlinear smooth breaks in the Fourier function, the stock market seemed to be efficient only during the 1999, 2011 and 2019 presidential election periods. The 2011 and 2019 are periods when the elections produced candidates that ran for a two-term each. On the other hand, the highest stock market volatility is still maintained at the 2015 election which was also interestingly the year that the recent 2015/2016 recession in the country kick-started. Our findings have important policy implications for potential investors.

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The Coevolution of Economic and Political Development From Monarchy to Democracy*

Cited by 15 publications

References 65 publications

Resource Curse, Political Entry, and Deadweight Costs

Resource Curse, Political Entry, and Deadweight Costs

Intrafamily bargaining and love

The Persistence of Stock Market Returns During the Presidential Elections in Nigeria

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