The coercive laws of competition in a neoliberal era: the case of forestry in Costa Rica

Matulis, Brett Sylvester

doi:10.2458/v23i1.20217

Cited by 3 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 24 publications

(23 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This is related to how design and transaction costs are increased/reduced by other instruments and the practices in use, which are an essential factor to be considered when evaluating institutional performance (Bollman and Hardy, ; Coggan et al , ). For example, Matulis () provides a detailed analysis of how the role of forester intermediaries – ‘regentes forestales’ – developed over time as part of PSA. The law defined position rules allowing private forest contractors to administer application, contracting and monitoring of PSA.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Over time this has led to regentes favouring large landholders because of economies of scale, illicitly charging smallholders more than the maximum fixed rates in some cases, and private contractors outcompeting non‐profit non‐governmental organization intermediaries representing smallholders. This dynamic is a result of the interaction of position and pay‐off rules, but is not explained by the rules per se, but additionally by a more active role and agency that can be captured by the ‘theory of coercive competition’ (Matulis, ). However, rules‐in‐use provide a framework for describing the institutional structure as sources of agency and transaction costs of PES.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Costa Rica's payments for ecosystem services programme is a very well‐known, analysed and publicized case of PES that has been used to discuss PES definitions (Rojas and Aylward, ; Pagiola, ; Wunder et al , ; Daniels et al , ) and normative characteristics and ideologies of PES (Fletcher and Breitling, ; Matulis, , ). However, PSA case analysis has not led to consensus on the nature of this instrument.…”

Section: Analysis Framework and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, PSA case analysis has not led to consensus on the nature of this instrument. PSA provides a rich example of research broadening over time to consider policy context (Pagiola, ; Daniels et al , ; Le Coq et al , ; Porras et al , ; Robalino et al , , ; Fletcher and Breitling, ; Matulis, , ; Le Coq et al , ; Rosendal and Schei, ). Thus, PSA is a good case to demonstrate a framework that endeavours to go beyond ideological debate on PES instruments.…”

Section: Analysis Framework and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The intention of this paper is not to offer another definition of PES (Wunder, ; Muradian et al , ; Fletcher and Breitling, ; Pirard, ; Pirard and Lapeyre, ; Wunder, ), nor an interpretation of its ideological objectives (Dempsey and Robertson, ; Matulis, , ; Fletcher and Büscher, ), but rather we focus our attention on describing PES' institutional context and interaction with other policy instruments. Just like any successful new policy instruments, enduring PES regimes have resulted from processes of adaptation and co‐evolution with the existing policy mixes (Primmer et al , ; Ring and Barton, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Payments for Ecosystem Services as a Policy Mix: Demonstrating the institutional analysis and development framework on conservation policy instruments

Barton

Benavides²,

Chacón-Cascante

et al. 2017

Env Pol Gov

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Policy mix analysis has been applied in research on energy, climate, urban and transport policy, and more recently biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services. However, policy mix analysis has thus far been employed at a high conceptual level, focusing on describing interactions between instrument types. Policy mix analysis rarely describes instrument ‘structure’ or functional characteristics in a way that would answer the question ‘what constitutes an instrument’? We describe how the rules‐in‐use taxonomy of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, developed for research on common pool resource management, can be used to characterize conservation policy instrument interactions. We demonstrate the approach on the well‐known payments for ecosystem services (PES) program in Costa Rica and cross‐compliance policies, arguing that PES is a policy mix rather than a single economic instrument. Our analysis shows how design features of PES described in the economics literature map to ‘rules‐in‐use’ in the IAD framework. The framework provides a terminology for defining what constitutes institutional context, comparing economic, regulatory and information instruments, and studying their interactions. The rules‐in‐use taxonomy of IAD is a ‘structural’ diagnostic approach, which needs to be combined with other tools that analyse the role and ‘agency’ of actors, as part of integrative environmental governance research. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Analysis Framework and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Analysis Framework and Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Payments for Ecosystem Services as a Policy Mix: Demonstrating the institutional analysis and development framework on conservation policy instruments

Barton

Benavides²,

Chacón-Cascante

et al. 2017

Env Pol Gov

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Payments for Ecosystem Services: Program Design and Participation

James¹,

Sills²

2019

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Environmental Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This is an advance summary of a forthcoming article in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Environmental Science. Please check back later for the full article. Payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs are broadly defined as voluntary programs that pay (in-kind or cash) for provision of environmental services either to a specific user or to society at large, with payments conditional on agreed-upon rules of natural resource management. PES programs have been established in a variety of contexts to address environmental issues such as forest degradation, watershed management, and biodiversity protection. They often pay landowners for conservation practices, including protection of native ecosystems. The early literature on PES is grounded in the Coase Theorem, which suggests that negative environmental externalities can be reduced through voluntary, market-like transactions, as long as transaction costs are low and property rights are clearly defined. In the context of PES, the Coase Theorem suggests payments negotiated directly between beneficiaries and producers of ecosystem services could result in an equilibrium price and quantity that maximize welfare, thus creating a more cost-effective conservation program. In addition, in both developed and developing countries, there is a high spatial correlation between areas that could supply ecosystem services and areas where poverty is high. This leads to equity arguments for PES as a way for society to compensate the relatively poor providers of ecosystem services. Thus, many programs have dual environmental and social policy objectives of ecosystem service provision and rural development or poverty alleviation. That is, PES programs are expected to result in “win-win” scenarios by simultaneously reducing negative environmental externalities and helping the poor. In practice, PES institutions diverge significantly from the market transactions suggestion by the Coasian framework. Governments often administer PES programs, using public revenues to make payments on a defined per-hectare schedule (not determined by the market or by the ecosystem services produced) to landowners who apply for the programs. Both the transaction costs of applying to the program and the selection rules shape the distribution of participation across ecological zones and landowner types. There are often trade-offs between minimizing transactions costs and maximizing benefits, and between providing ecosystem services and social objectives. There is some evidence these departures from theory and other implementation issues, such as nonexistent or inconsistent monitoring, have made the “win-win” scenario elusive. However, through a case study of the Costa Rican program, we show how program administrators can design and implement institutional changes to PES programs in order to address concerns about cost efficiency and the distribution of participation.

show abstract

Cash Burning Machine: Uber’s Logic of Planetary Expansion

Munn

2019

tripleC

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Uber’s programme of planetary expansion rapidly captures users and integrates cities. Like other platforms, Uber privileges growth at all costs in order to spin up a set of self-reinforcing dynamics like virtuous cycles and network effects. However, drawing on Arrighi, Hobson, and Arendt, Uber can also be understood as a contemporary incarnation of imperialism. Platforms extend their territories in a programme of aggressive expansion rationalized by future financial gains. The article combines these self-perpetuating technical dynamics with the self-expanding logics of empire. Against the assumed brilliance of founders and the strategic innovation of start-ups, this framing highlights some of the uncontrolled forces and overarching imperatives that both invest and constrain platforms.

show abstract

The coercive laws of competition in a neoliberal era: the case of forestry in Costa Rica

Cited by 3 publications

References 24 publications

Payments for Ecosystem Services as a Policy Mix: Demonstrating the institutional analysis and development framework on conservation policy instruments

Payments for Ecosystem Services as a Policy Mix: Demonstrating the institutional analysis and development framework on conservation policy instruments

Payments for Ecosystem Services: Program Design and Participation

Cash Burning Machine: Uber’s Logic of Planetary Expansion

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About