The City Manager’s Role in Policy-Making

Abstract

The city manager's role in policy-making has long been recognized in the public administration literature. However, it remains unclear why city managers participate in policy-making at different levels. Two alternative models have been proposed in the literature: the substitution model and the collaboration model. The present study considers multiple dimensions of political leadership and advances a more comprehensive theoretical framework. It then undertakes an empirical examination, using survey data collected from city managers in Georgia. The results uncover more complicated configurations of political dynamics in local government than described by either the substitution or the collaboration model.

Legislative capacity, bureaucratic reputation, and delegation from a trust perspective: A survey experiment

“…City managers' reputation is manifested in their experiences, credentials, performance, and professional networks, embodying individual trustworthiness. It is important not only for elected officials' initial hiring decisions but also for their decisions to assign policy power to the manager (Zhang, 2014). It provides a reasonable signal that a community is exceptionally satisfied with the manager's job performance and continues to count on her service (Lee & Lee, 2021).…”

“…One set includes contextual characteristics such as policy uncertainty (Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004), policy complexity (Huber & Shipan, 2002), policy conflict between principals and agents (Huber & Shipan, 2002) and government structures (Zhang & Feiock, 2010). Another set is on the agents: capacity (MacDonald & Franko, 2007), professionalism (Zhang, 2014) and reputation (Carpenter & Krause, 2012). The third is on the principals: capacity (Huber & Shipan, 2002), risk preferences (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999) and the quality and content of information available (Calvert et al., 1989).…”

“…Third, it sheds light on the debate between two models of politics‐administration relationship: the substitution model and the complementarity model. The argument that politicians without sufficient expertize must rely on bureaucrats has evolved into a “substitution” model, where strong principal capacity and strong agent discretion substitute each other (Zhang, 2014). Some empirical results support this hypothesis (Zhang, 2014; Zhang & Feiock, 2010).…”

“…The argument that politicians without sufficient expertize must rely on bureaucrats has evolved into a “substitution” model, where strong principal capacity and strong agent discretion substitute each other (Zhang, 2014). Some empirical results support this hypothesis (Zhang, 2014; Zhang & Feiock, 2010). However, principals' capacity also means the extent to which they can control bureaucrats (Waterman & Meier, 1998), so strong principal capacity can go hand in hand with strong agent discretion.…”

The Determinants of Municipal Structures on a Political-Administrative Dimension

“…CAOs are usually trained experts who hold professional degrees and have extensive experience in public management and administration (Demir & Reddick, 2012; Nalbandian, 1999; Zhang & Feiock, 2009). They usually have considerable discretion in municipal governments’ policy formulation and implementation (Demir & Reddick, 2012; Selden, Brewer, & Brudney, 1999; Zhang, 2014; Zhang & Feiock, 2009). Placing local government management under a CAO has the potential to increase government management efficiency (Deno & Mehay, 1987; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998).…”