The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign

Williams, Brian Glyn

doi:10.1080/1057610x.2010.508483

Cited by 51 publications

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“…In November 2002, in North Yemen, for example, a CIA Predator killed Abu Ali al‐Harithi, a purported planner of the USS Cole bombing. The drone strikes in Pakistan began on June 18, 2004, with the killing in South Waziristan of Nek Mohammed, a militant commander who boldly pronounced in Western media his ongoing jihad against the United States along with his commitment to give sanctuary to al‐Qaeda and Taliban forces (Williams : 873–4). The decision to begin drone strikes was taken after 2 years of halfhearted Pakistani military operations in FATA that failed to eliminate Taliban and al‐Qaeda bases, followed by the Pakistani government signing a peace agreement on April 24, 2004, that pardoned local leaders for resisting the army and effectively ceded control of the region to them (Rashid : 274–5).…”

Section: Why Conduct Predator Drone Strikes In Pakistan?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…: 13). Baitullah Mehsud, for example, openly acknowledged responsibility for a string of devastating suicide bombings against Pakistanis and frequently taunted the United States, making bold statements such as “I am glad they have listed me as their enemy because I fight for the supremacy of Islam….” (Williams ; Bhittani ). It was widely noted that after his targeting, there was virtually no popular protest or government or media condemnation (Mayer ; Williams : 4).…”

Section: What Is Wrong With Dramatically Expanding the Drone Campaign?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…What is lost in translation is that a “student” at a madrassa is locally known as a talib, the plural being taliban. After the strike, the Pakistani government released infrared footage of the “students” engaged in military training at the facility and claimed that many of them had recently attended a rally where they vowed allegiance to bin Laden (Williams : 875–6). Nonetheless, according to the New York Times , “The strike set off rallies and demonstrations in the tribal areas and Pakistan's cities protesting the high number of casualties and the perceived American involvement” (Gall and Khan ).…”

Section: What Is Wrong With Dramatically Expanding the Drone Campaign?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Tracking the Predators: Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan

Plaw

Fricker

2012

Int Stud Perspect

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This article examines the strategic wisdom of the US Predator drone campaign in Pakistan, particularly in light of the dramatic expansion in the number of strikes that has occurred under the Obama administration. First, it examines whether there is a compelling rationale for any drone strikes in Pakistan by evaluating the justification advanced by US authorities and the three main criticisms that have been leveled against the campaign. With the help of an original database of drone strikes and their effects compiled by the authors of the article, it shows that the criticisms lack merit and that some strikes may be justified in principle. Second, it turns to the reasons explaining the dramatic increase in strikes over the past 2 years. On examination, it finds that the arguments supporting the expansion of the campaign are forceful but not necessarily decisive. In the third section it considers some objections to an expanded campaign. Finally, in the closing section, it weighs these considerations against the points favoring the expansion of the drone strikes. The article ends with the conclusion that on balance it would be prudent to shift back towards a more narrowly focused campaign concentrating on al‐Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban and only leaders of the Pakistani Taliban.

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Section: Why Conduct Predator Drone Strikes In Pakistan?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What Is Wrong With Dramatically Expanding the Drone Campaign?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What Is Wrong With Dramatically Expanding the Drone Campaign?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Tracking the Predators: Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan

Plaw

Fricker

2012

Int Stud Perspect

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“…"These fighters were allowed to build out a sanctuary by Pakistani officials who arrested Al-Qaeda terrorists in the cities, yet, generally left the Taliban (whom they had previously supported) untouched in the Pashtun tribal areas, thus, the Taliban took advantage of the situation to construct a state-within-state in FATA" (Williams, 2010). This made the US National Intelligence to put FATA as "an important focus for the US national security", a position that only few places on earth could gain (Markey, 2008). Addressing the situation in FATA becomes an important aspect to the US national interest.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Us Strategy of Armed Drone Usage in Fighting the Taliban Elements in Pakistan (2004-2016)

Nadhifa

Perwita

2019

Pertahanan

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<p>Prior to the Trump’s presidency the US have performed as many as 400 armed drone strikes in Pakistan, killing approximately 3.000 terrorist targets including key leaders that hold important value to the organizations. More than a decade these attacks were performed, yet we have not seen the end of the terrorist and insurgent’s presence in Pakistan. This leads into a thought whether the attacks were effective or not. Therefore, this study aims to analyze, predominantly evaluating the use of the targeted killing strategy in this US counterterrorism effort. The study uses qualitative research method by using Robert A. Pape’s perspective in strategic effectiveness and David Galula’s counterinsurgency perspective. Those perspectives pointed out the cause of this situation is due to the inability of the attacked target set to trigger the destruction of the movement, the inability of the US to secure the ends, ways, and means of the operation which involve the dissociation between the population and the insurgents, their ability to forge proper cooperation with its local ally, and the un-favoring view of the local population toward its targeted killings practice has resulted in the infectivity of the strategy and a prolonged fight between the US and its opponent. In sum, it can be inferred that despite capable of eliminating numerous high-value targets the targeted killing strategy is deemed ineffective due to its inability to procure full destruction of its opponent and due to the inability of the US to secure the ends, ways, and means of the operation which would have increase the success of the strategy.</p>

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“…The third strand can be said to fuse the first two and consists of case-specific studies which range from the use of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) (e.g. Holmqvist, 2013;Glyn-Williams, 2010a;Gregory 2011a-b;Turse, 2011Turse, , 2012Engelhardt 2014;Price, 2012;Turse & Engelhardt, 2012) to SOF action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere (Glyn-Williams, 2010b;Robinson, 2013;Sanger, 2012).…”

Section: The Need For a Definition And How To Get Therementioning

confidence: 99%

Global shadow war: a conceptual analysis

Lyckman

Weissmann

2015

Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict

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PostprintThis is the accepted version of a paper published in Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict. This paper has been peer-reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof-corrections or journal pagination.Citation for the original published paper (version of record):Lyckman, M., Weissmann, M. (2015) Global shadow war: conceptual analysis. Dynamics of Asymmetric AbstractThe US strategic shift from nation-building to what has been labelled "light footprint" has carried with it a number of changes in the practices used when waging war on terrorism. These activities include covert and clandestine action by special operations and paramilitary forces, and others, operating under a shadowy mandate. It is essential to analyse these changes, due to the nature of the actions taken and the global reach and consequences of US foreign policies. The concept of "global shadow war" has been used by scholars and journalists alike to describe the practices associated with the light footprint framework, although the concept is ambiguous, lacks clear conceptual boundaries and is yet to be defined.This article attempts to resolve the problem of ambiguity through a systematic analysis of how and when the concept is used, in the process establishing its conceptual boundaries and definitional qualities. Using a method for concept analysis developed by Giovanni Sartori, the article provides a conceptual definition which is more clearly delineated, encompasses the characteristics found in the sources studied, and can be used when theorizing about the many practices taking place within the light footprint framework.

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The CIA's Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History of an Assassination Campaign

Cited by 51 publications

References 0 publications

Tracking the Predators: Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan

Tracking the Predators: Evaluating the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan

The Us Strategy of Armed Drone Usage in Fighting the Taliban Elements in Pakistan (2004-2016)

Global shadow war: a conceptual analysis

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