The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy

Keohane, Nathaniel O.; Revesz, Richard L.; Stavins, Robert N.

doi:10.4324/9781315194288-10

Cited by 66 publications

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“…Typologies of policy instruments typically include between three and 15 instruments (Salamon ; Vedung ), although “compiling a defensible list of basic policy instruments is no simple matter” (Linder and Peters , 44). Therefore, we do not attempt to be exhaustive in our classification of instruments and instead consider two general types—regulations and incentives—which are the most frequently employed and important categories of instruments in U.S. environmental policy (Freeman ; Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins ). Moreover, because these instrument types exhibit clear differences in how to achieve policy objectives, there is both theoretical and practical relevance in understanding their selection.…”

Section: Policy Instrument Selection Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Policy instruments have been well studied from theoretical economic and political perspectives (e.g., Feiock and Yi, forthcoming; Howlett ; Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins ; Salamon ; Schneider and Ingram , ; Yi and Feiock ) and their selection empirically examined at higher levels of government, including states and counties (Feiock, Tavares, and Lubell ; Matisoff ; Soss et al ; Yi and Feiock ). However, with the exception of economic development policy (Feiock, Jeoung, and Kim ), the specific factors influencing cities' choices for policy instruments have received little empirical attention.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Drivers of Policy Instrument Selection for Environmental Management by Local Governments

Krause

Hawkins

Park

et al. 2019

Public Administration Review

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Local governments commonly pursue environmental objectives that exceed state and federal minimum requirements. Although research informs our understanding of factors that lead cities to adopt such policy goals, the underlying mechanisms employed to achieve them are not well understood. This article examines factors that drive the choice of policy instruments that cities use to pursue local environmental objectives. The literature links the structure of the local governing body, characteristics of the community and target populations, and the nature of the policy problem to instrument selection. Building on this, the authors model the dynamics shaping cities' use of regulations, financial incentives, or combination thereof, to pursue a variety of different environmental objectives. Results indicate that community racial composition and political leaning influence instrument choice when policy targets the public at large. Alternatively, when policy targets particular stakeholder groups, such as developers, the characteristics of the local governing body are of greater importance.

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Section: Policy Instrument Selection Dynamicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Drivers of Policy Instrument Selection for Environmental Management by Local Governments

Krause

Hawkins

Park

et al. 2019

Public Administration Review

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“…National uniformity can come at the expense of regulations more narrowly tailored to achieve optimal outcomes. Third, even if environmental regulation does not raise the profits of an entire industry, it can benefit certain firms within an industry (Keohane, Revesz and Stavins 1998). Firms within an industry likely will incur different costs in the regulatory requirements, because some firms will be able to adjust their production processes more easily than others.…”

Section: A Political Economy Perspective On How Standards Are Setmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is anecdotal evidence which may suggest that the existence of tradeable permit programs is changing the way firms evaluate environmental risk(Hartridge 2003; Tientenberg 2003).116 See, for example,Goldstein (1991) on species protection, andFisher et al (1996);Hahn and Stavins (1995);Schmalensee (1998); on applications to global climate change. More broadly, see:Ayres (2000).117 This section of the chapter draws upon:Keohane, Revesz and Stavins (1998);Hahn and Stavins (1991);.…”

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confidence: 99%

Environmental Law and Policy

Clarke¹,

Peterson²

2016

Environmental Conflict Management

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This chapter for the Handbook of Law and Economics provides an economic perspective of environmental law and policy. We examine the ends of environmental policy, that is, the setting of goals and targets, beginning with normative issues, notably the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the related method of assessment known as benefit-cost analysis. We examine this analytical method in detail, including its theoretical foundations and empirical methods of estimation of compliance costs and environmental benefits. We review critiques of benefit-cost analysis, and examine alternative approaches to analyzing the goals of environmental policies. We examine the means of environmental policy, that is, the choice of specific policy instruments, beginning with an examination of potential criteria for assessing alternative instruments, with particular focus on cost-effectiveness. The theoretical foundations and experiential highlights of individual instruments are reviewed, including conventional, command-and-control mechanisms, market-based instruments, and liability rules. Three cross-cutting issues receive attention: uncertainty; technological change; and distributional considerations. We identify normative lessons in regard to design, implementation, and the identification of new applications, and we examine positive issues: the historical dominance of command-and-control; the prevalence in new proposals of tradeable permits allocated without charge; and the relatively recent increase in attention given to market-based instruments. We also examine the question of how environmental responsibility is and should be allocated among the various levels of government. We provide a positive review of the responsibilities of Federal, state, and local levels of government in the environmental realm, plus a normative assessment of this allocation of regulatory responsibility. We focus on three arguments that have been made for Federal environmental regulation: competition among political jurisdictions and the race to the bottom; transboundary environmental problems; and public choice and systematic bias. Richard L. Revesz

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“…It was estimated that the total amount of NO x , SO 2 and PM emissions from China's power plants was about 8.34 Tg, 7.8 Tg and 1.42 Tg, respectively, in 2014 [6]. To control the emissions of gaseous pollutants from coal-fired power plants, multiple policies on energy conservation and emission abatement have been implemented, including the evolution of policy instrument choice [7,8], the closure of small and inefficient boilers, the improvement in techniques [9][10][11][12] and the effectiveness of national air pollution Figure 1. Study area and location of major coal-fired power plants in Anhui Province.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of Control Measures on Nitrogen Oxides, Sulfur Dioxide and Particulate Matter Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants in Anhui Province, China

Dai

Zhu

et al. 2019

Atmosphere

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Anhui is one of the highest provincial emitters of air pollutants in China due to its large coal consumption in coal-fired plants. In this study, the total emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2) and particulate matter (PM) from coal-fired power plants in Anhui were investigated to assess the impact of control measures on the atmospheric emissions based upon continuous emission monitoring systems (CEMS). The total NOx, SO2 and PM emissions significantly decreased from 2013 to 2017 and they were estimated at 24.5 kt, 14.8 kt and 3.0 kt in 2017, respectively. The emission reductions of approximately 79.0%, 70.1% and 81.2% were achieved in 2017 compared with a 2013 baseline, respectively, due to the application of high-efficiency emission control measures, including the desulfurization, denitration and dust-removing devices and selective catalytic reduction (SCR). The NOx, SO2 and PM emission intensities were 0.125 g kWh−1, 0.076 g kWh−1 and 0.015 g kWh−1 in 2017, respectively, which were lower than the average of national coal-fired units. The coal-fired units with ≥600 MW generated 80.6% of the total electricity amount while they were estimated to account for 70.5% of total NOx, 70.1% of total SO2 and 71.9% of total PM. Their seasonal emissions showed a significant correlation to the power generation with the maximum correlation found in summer (July and August) and winter (January and December). The major regional contributors are the cities along the Huai River Basin and Yangtze River Basin, such as Huainan, Huaibei, Tongling, Maanshan and Wuhu, and the highest emission occurred in Huainan, accounting for approximately 26–40% of total emission from all the power plants. Our results indicated that the application of desulfurization, denitration and dust-removing devices has played an important role in controlling air pollutant emissions from coal-fired power plants.

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The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy

Cited by 66 publications

References 0 publications

Drivers of Policy Instrument Selection for Environmental Management by Local Governments

Drivers of Policy Instrument Selection for Environmental Management by Local Governments

Environmental Law and Policy

Impact of Control Measures on Nitrogen Oxides, Sulfur Dioxide and Particulate Matter Emissions from Coal-Fired Power Plants in Anhui Province, China

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